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ABSTRACT 
Laslovich, Michael Joseph, M.A., Fall 1978 Political Science 
The Parti Québécois and Quebec Separatism (113 pp.) 
Director: Thomas Payne 
Within the Canadian federation exists the predominately French-
speaking province of Quebec. After more than one hundred years of 
membership within the Canadian federation, the Parti Québécois, the 
ruling party, is now calling for the political independence of 
Quebec. It feels that only through political independence can it 
ensure the continued survival and prosperity of Quebec's French cul­
ture. Continued membership in the Canadian federation, according to 
the Parti Québécois, would result in the assimilation of French 
Canadians into the English Canadian way of life. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Parti Québécois's 
efforts to achieve political independence for the Canadian province 
of Quebec. The work includes a look at the history of the French-
Canadian separatist movement, the development of the Parti Québécois 
along with its program, and an analysis of the potential for success 
of the separatist movement. This analysis of the Parti Québécois is 
based upon a general survey of existing literature and documents 
addressing this topic. Public opinion surveys, election analyses, 
party programs, and other relevant works are utilized. 
Because of the current nature of the problem, a definitive predic­
tion of the outcome is impossible. However, no matter what the out­
come of the Parti Québécois's bid for independence, the Canadian 
federation will not remain unchanged. It is likely the central 
government will become more decentralized in face of Quebec's de­
mands . 
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On November 15, 197 6, the voters of the Canadian 
province of Quebec elevated the Parti Québécois to power, 
and in so doing brought forward the issue of independence. 
Although the phenomena of Quebec separatism is not new, its 
resurgence has caused grave concern both within and outside 
Canada. 
The history of French and English Canadian relations 
has been marked by suspicion, misunderstanding, and sometimes 
even violence. French Canadians, though, have managed to 
maintain their culture in face of the assimilative pressures 
of the English-dominated country. Although French Canadians 
have employed various strategies at different periods, their 
primary goal has always been to preserve their French way of 
life. 
The French-speaking citizens of New France became sub­
jects of Great Britain as a result of France's defeat by the 
English in 1760. Ever since that time French Canadians have 
been concerned with the maintenance of their French language 
and customs. 
French Canadians were most concerned with retaining 
as much freedom as possible to ensure the continuance of 
1 
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their life as it had been for almost two hundred years. The 
British government tried to attract English settlers into its 
new colony by offering vacant lands free to ex-soldiers and 
easy terms to others . French Canadians did not favor the 
idea of English settlers invading their homeland, nor were 
English Canadians enthusiastic to venture to a land where 
they might be denied the customary rights of Englishmen. It 
was precisely when French and English Canadians came into con­
tact that trouble began because of their divergent customs. 
English Canadians demanded that they receive their accustomed 
rights. Understandably, French Canadians interpreted almost 
any action of their English conquerors as motivated by con­
tempt, superiority, or malice towards them. This unfortunate 
heritage of misunderstanding is the heaviest cross that Canada 
has had to bear and is one source of the current separatist 
movement. 
The British government sought to impose modified Eng­
lish institutions upon its French subjects while granting 
rights to the French Canadians in hopes of winning their 
allegiance. French Canadians took advantage of such rights 
as elective assemblies, but only to the extent to protect 
themselves. They did not become active in national affairs 
but instead preferred to remain isolated, using those rights 
granted them by their English masters to protect themselves 
from outside interference. Ironically, measures designed to 
capture French-Canadian support, such as the Act of Union of 
3 
1840, were to later frustrate the wishes of English Canadians. 
French Canadians, however, clung to those measures advantageous 
to their cultural survival. 
Contrary to the British government's expectations, 
French Canadians managed to keep their culture intact, a cul^ 
ture which had developed almost two hundred years in North 
America before the English conquest. Canada has always been 
forced to recognize the French fact and still must today. 
The nature of the French Canadian changed drastically 
with the industrialization and urbanization of Quebec. French 
Canadians were no longer content only to utilize their pro­
vincial government in a negative manner; that is, in fighting 
off federal interference. Instead, they began to make demands 
upon their provincial government for positive action to ensure 
not only the survival, but the growth of their culture. As a 
result, the provincial government of Quebec, beginning with 
Jean Lesage in the early 1960s, made greater demands upon the 
federal government for more extensive provincial power. 
French Canadians no longer tolerated English domination 
of Quebec business. For many years French Canadians were dis­
couraged by the Catholic Church to choose careers in business. 
However, under the forces of modernization, the Catholic Church 
lost its powerful influence over Quebecers. Quebecers received 
training in those areas which they had previously shunned. 
Naturally, this new French Canadian middle class,made up of 
highly skilled individuals, sought employment in their French-
4 
speaking province. They were frustrated when they discovered 
that many English-dominated companies which operated in Quebec 
would not hire them to fill top job positions because of their 
inability to speak English. Thus, in their own province, 
French Canadians were excluded from top positions because of 
their language. Although French Canadians realized that their 
language was a handicap outside Quebec, where they comprised 
a minority, they could not accept the idea that their language 
should hinder them in Quebec where French-speaking citizens 
comprised the majority. 
One source of the current French Canadian dissatisfac­
tion with the Canadian federation, therefore, is tied to 
economic considerations. French Quebecers resent that they 
are discriminated against because of their language in their 
own province. 
This point is important to note: French Canadians are 
largely concentrated in the province of Quebec. This fact 
has aided in the amazing survival of French-Canadian culture 
in North America. Many French Canadians say they only feel 
at home in Quebec, that this province is their homeland. As 
a result, the fact that they should be discriminated against 
because of their language is unacceptable. 
Fears of cultural assimilation have combined with 
economic considerations to make the option of political separa­
tion more appealing to French-speaking Quebecers. Today's 
French Canadian is faced with a dilemma. First and foremost. 
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throughout his history he has sought to maintain his culture. 
Today's French Canadians, however, are a modern people who 
want to develop fully to their potential. The dilemma arises 
from the fact that French-speaking individuals are being told 
that their language is a handicap to advancement in an English-
dominated business world. 
French Canadians want both. They not only want to 
advance economically, but they want to do it without the loss 
of their French customs. They do not want to grow economically 
at the price of cultural assimilation. 
Pierre Trudeau, in keeping with his belief in the 
federalist solution, has tried to satisfy French Canadians 
through a policy of bilingualism. He has sought to make 
French-speaking Quebecers at home within the Canadian federa­
tion and not culturally threatened. Trudeau's policy has 
attracted criticism from both English and French Canadians. 
Some English Canadians feel it is a wasted effort; French 
Canadians should learn to speak English since it is the lan­
guage of business in North America and of the vast majority 
in Canada. Many French Canadians, on the other hand, are 
irritated by what they feel is an unfulfilled policy. Still 
other French Canadians feel that bilingualism is only 
another attempt by English-speaking Canadians to assimilate 
French Canadians by giving them a false sense of security 
through the facade of bilingualism. 
The political separation option for Quebec raises 
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a whole host of other questions, not only concerning the 
future of the Canadian federation, but also for the United 
States and the rest of the world. Among them are; "Can an 
independent Quebec survive economically?," "Would the remain­
ing Canadian federation remain intact?," "Is separation legal 
according to the Canadian constitution?," and "What would be 
the ramifications of political independence throughout the 
world?" The merits of independence for Quebecers is also 
questionable. Would political independence really make a 
difference for the French-speaking members of Quebec, or would 
it only entail greater hardships for them? 
The question of political independence for Quebec is 
thus very complicated. The purpose of this work is to focus 
on the Parti Québécois and its efforts to achieve independence 
for Quebec, since a study of all variables would require an 
enormous scope. A detailed study of the cultural, economic 
and world implications of Quebec independence must be left to 
others. This study includes a look at the history of the 
separatist movement, the development of the Parti Québécois 
from 1968 to 1976, the PQ program, and an analysis of the po­
tential for success of the Parti Québécois. 
This analysis of the Parti Québécois is based upon a 
general survey of existing literature and documents addressing 
this topic. Public opinion surveys, election analyses, party 
programs, and other works relevenat to the Parti Québécois in 
its quest for political independence are utilized. 
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Because o£ the complexity of the French-Canadian ques­
tion, only the political aspect of this problem is addressed. 
Hopefully others will find this work helpful in their attempts 
to discern the reality of the French-Canadian problem. The 
solution of the French-Canadian issue of separatism is impor­
tant not only for Canadians, but for the rest of the world. 
Canada plays a major role in world affairs and any disruption 
in its internal affairs would have profound effects upon the 
world, especially the United States. Thus it is important 
that Americans understand the importance of French-Canadian 
demands for independence. 
Separatist Option 
Central to the purpose of the Parti Québécois is the 
issue of separation. Why does this phenomena exist in Quebec? 
According to one analysis: 
The option of independence, usually called 'separatism' 
in English, has always existed in Quebec. At times 
expressed by isolated intellectuals, at times through 
armed revolt, the independence movement took the form 
of a group of intellectuals in the 1930's (Andre 
Laurendeau, Jean-Louis Gagnon, etc.), then of a 
series of political parties, for instance, the 
Rassemblement pour 1'Independence Nationale and the 
Ralliement National, both of which participated in 
the general elections of June 5, 1966, and the Parti 
Québécois, which'participated in the general elections 
of April 29, 1970. Although the programs of these 
movements and parties varied widely, they all con­
tained one important element: the conviction that 
there is a complete lack of harmony between an exist­
ing - or emerging - society and the political and 
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other institutions which are - or should be - its 
framework, its tools, its indispensable aids.l 
The Parti Québécois contends that the institutions of 
a society must serve a majority of its inhabitants, but that 
under the current Canadian federal system the confrontation 
between a permanent majority (Anglophone Canadians) and a 
permanent minority (Francophone Canadians) makes the existing 
institutions undesirable for the French majority in Quebec. 
As Dr. Marcel Chaput, a prominent leader, states: 
. . . no matter which way you look at it, we form 
a powerless minority. You may say that the Quebec 
ballots decide the [national] vote. It has been 
true at times, but the 1957 elections put the lie 
to that belief. From now on, a political party can 
get itself into office at Ottawa and form a stable 
government without having to cater to Quebec. For 
this reason, 1957 is an important date in the his­
tory of French Canada.2 
Separatists are very pessimistic about their future in 
the Canadian federation. Although they have been able to main­
tain their unique culture, French separatists believe that it 
cannot be preserved under the continued association -with Eng­
lish Canada. René Levesque believes that, "For Quebec, in fact, 
independence is a vital necessity; for Canada, Quebec's inde­
pendence is the prerequisite to a fuller development. For the 
two states this would provide a new and fruitful start. For we 
Andre Laroque, "Political Institutions'and Quebec 
Society," in Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the 
Inside, ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1973), pp. 75-76. 
2 
Marcel Chaput, Why I Am a Separatist (Toronto: The 
Ryerson Press, 1961), p. 24. 
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are a deadweight on English Canada, and we ourselves lead a 
mutilated existence."^ 
The question, "What does Quebec want?" has been asked 
by English Canadians throughout their association with their 
French counterparts. With the emergence of the Quiet Revolu­
tion of the 1960s, Quebecers were no longer satisfied to re­
main behind the negative nationalistic policies of their gov­
ernment. Quebecers now wanted their provincial government to 
take an active part in protecting their way of life. Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau, then a law professor, thought that only 
through an active role in Canadian affairs could Quebec's French 
culture withstand the test against the English majority. He 
wrote, ". . . no constitutional reform - indeed not even a dec­
laration of independence - could make French a majority language 
of business and industry in North America, or make Quebec a 
state capable of dictating its terms to the rest of the conti­
nent . 
Separatists, represented by the Parti Québécois, dis­
agree with Trudeau's federal solution. Today, according to one 
historian, "... the Québécois want to preserve the French lan­
guage and culture, to control immigration, to establish an inde­
pendent foreign policy, and to secure all they can from Ottawa 
^Rene LeVesque, An Option for Quebec (Toronto; 
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 112. 
^Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French 
Canadians (Toronto: Macmillin of Canada, 1968), p. 8. 
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now without relaxing the pressure for eventual separation."^ 
There seems to be no hope for accommodation short of separa­
tion between Ottawa and Quebec in the view of Dr. Chaput: , 
"The removal of each individual injustice suffered by the 
French-Canadians will not cause the idea of an independent 
Quebec to disappear. We want independence for a totally dif­
ferent reason. It is because dignity requires it. It is be­
cause of the idea that minorities, like absentees, are always 
wrong. 
Sovereignty is for the PQ an essential condition for 
improving the collective life of the people of Quebec, who 
have always perceived that they are different from the rest 
of Canada, and have sought to maintain that difference. Some 
still argue for a special status for Quebec vis-a-vis the 
other provinces, but the PQ insists that the other provinces 
would not accept such an arrangement, and rightfully so. In 
the view of the PQ, independence offers much more, both to 
English and French Canada. As Rene Levesque stated: 
The important thing for today and for tomorrow is 
that both sides realize that this regime [the 
Canadian Federation] has had its day and that is 
a matter of urgency either to modify it profoundly 
or to build a new one. 
As we are the ones who have put up with its 
main disadvantages, it is natural we also should 
be in the greatest hurry to be rid of it; the more 
c . 
Kenneth M. Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," Current 
History, April 1977, p. 157. 
^Chaput, op. cit., p. 5. 
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so because it is we who are menaced most danger­
ously by its current paralysis.? 
Levesque believes federalism is only damaging an ". . . ancient 
hobble of a federalism suited to the last century . . ." leading 
to a ". . . perpetual atmosphere of instability, of wrangling 
over everything and over nothing. It would mean the steriliza­
tion of two collective 'personalities' which, having squandered 
the most precious part of their potential, would weaken each 
other so completely that they would have no other choice but to 
g 
draw themselves in the ample bosom of 'America'." 
Yet anti-separatists feel just the opposite: that if 
Quebec leaves Canada, other provinces may follow suit, leaving 
the door open for the United States to absorb large areas of a 
dismembered federation. In their view, Quebec has played a 
large part in preventing United States takeover of Canada. 
Again, what does Quebec want? According to Rene 
Levesque, it first and foremost wishes to secure its "collective 
personality:" French language, customs and practices-. This can 
only be achieved, the PQ asserts, by the complete mastery of 
every last area of basic collective decision making. Quebec 
must become sovereign as soon as possible. As a consequence, 
". . .we finally would have without our grasp the security of 
our collective 'being' which is so vital to us, a security 
9 
which otherwise must remain uncertain and incomplete." Also, 
Levesque, op. cit., p. 21. 
^Ibid., p. 26. 
^Ibid. 
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in the process, English Canada would become free to develop, 
following any path it chooses. 
The Parti Québécois believes that separation is not 
only necessary but inevitable, which has important consequences 
as far as the PQ's conduct is concerned. For example. Premier 
Levesque has promised to hold a referendum on political inde­
pendence. What if Quebecers should refuse to support indepen­
dence? Mr. Levesque says he will try again, assuming that if 
the people of Quebec are shown the merits of independence, 
they will naturally opt out of the federation. The PQ does not 
question the fact that independence will happen--only when. 
Language Assimilation 
Because of the PQ's concern with securing its collective 
existence, it is very concerned with preventing the forces of 
assimilation. One recent measure taken by the Parti Québécois 
has caused a great uproar throughout Canada as well as within 
Quebec; namely, the passage of Bill 101--the Official Language 
Act., This Act requires children of immigrants, whose mother 
tongue was not English, to attend French schools. In defense 
of this action, the PQ points to the rapid rate of assimila­
tion of immigrants into the English culture. Most immigrants 
who come to Quebec send their children to English schools be­
cause they believe this will be more beneficial when their 
children enter the English-speaking dominated job market. 
Between 1945 to 1967 inclusive, Canada accepted about three 
13 
million immigrants.^® More than 35 percent, on the average, 
were of Anglo-Saxon origin. The total for the French was 




Total Number of 
Immigrants 194,743 170,000 (9 months) 
Of English Origin 71, 505 (37 percent) 59 ,500 (35 percent) 
Of French Origin 6,675 (3 percent) 10 , 000 (6 percent) 
Source: Kenneth M. Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," Current 
History, April 1977, p. 157. 
Of the thirty-five Canadian immigration offices, six 
are in the United Kingdom and Ireland, five in Germany, and 
four in the United States, while there had been only one in 
France until Ottawa opened two new offices in 1966. 
Furthermore, countries and areas of the world which 
could provide excellent French-speaking applicants are com­
pletely neglected; there are no offices in Latin America, 
North Africa, in the Near East (except in Israel and Egypt), 
or in the French-speaking areas of Asia. 
A new agreement between the federal government and 
^^Glazier, op. cit., p. 154. 
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Quebec, signed February 20, 197 8, will improve Quebec's 
ability to choose the immigrants who wish to settle in Quebec, 
while respecting federal responsibilities for the admission 
of immigrants to the rest of Canada. The agreement allows 
Quebec to establish its own system of points for admitting 
immigrants. Although this will be similar to the federal 
government's system of points criteria, which is nationwide, 
Quebec will be able to give extra weight to the ability of 
prospective immigrants to speak French or to be absorbed into 
the French-speaking community in Quebec. The new accord 
supersedes the one signed in October 197 5, under which Quebec 
gave its advice on applications of immigrants destined to that 
province, but had no decision-making powers. 
There are other measures which make it possible to 
give consideration to certain provincial priorities of 
Quebec. First are instructions to federal representatives 
abroad, since the passage of the new act making French the 
sole official language in Quebec (Bill 101), to advise immi­
grants destined to Quebec of the francophone character of the 
province and their obligation to learn French and send their 
children to French schools. Second, before an employment 
visa is issued for Quebec, the province is consulted in order 
to determine the social and cultural implications of admitting 
temporary workers. Finally, a number of federal programs de­
signed to assist immigrant adjustments are also in line with 
Quebec's priorities in this field. In 1976 to 1977, Ottawa 
15 
spent $5,125,000 on language courses for immigrants. In 
Quebec's immigration orientation centres, 3,675 immigrants 
were given French courses during the year.^^ 
More recent figures on the percentage of French-
speaking citizens of Quebec contradict separatist claims 
of rapid assimilation. According to National Health and 
Welfare Minister Monique Begin, the francophone majority in 
Quebec, which rose by more than 200,000 from 1971 to 1976, 
12 
is now over five million. In the same five years, the 
anglophone and "other language" groups in Quebec have in­
creased by barely 3,000 persons each, with the result that 
Quebecers, whose mother tongue is French, account for more 
than 30 percent of the population increase in the province 
over the past five years. Consequently, the French-speaking 
majority in Quebec grew from 80.7 percent of the total popula­
tion of Quebec in 1971 to 81.3 percent in 1976. 
The results, according to Minister Begin, are: 
The actual state of affairs, then contradicts the 
separatist thesis but it does confirm that of the 
francophone federalists. The French fact is a 
solid and massive one, an irreversible one in 
Quebec, but it is more fragile and its position 
has not yet been consolidated in the other 
regions of the country. In fact, the analysis 
commissioned by the Federal Government from 
Rejean Lachapelle of the Institut de recherches 
politiques de Montreal indicates that the posi­
tions of the francophone minorities in Ontario 
^^"Francophone Immigration: A History of Federal-
Provincial Co-operation," Canada Weekly, 8 March 1978, p. 2. 
12 
"Quebec's French-speaking Majority on the Increase," 
Canada Weekly, 14 December 1977, p. 3. 
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and New Brunswick have weakened in the past five 
years. In New Brunswick the population with 
French as its mother tongue has dropped from 34 
to 33.6 per cent of the total from 1971 to 1976. 
In Ontario it has dropped from 6.3 to 5.7 per 
cent. 
These trends can hardly move one to be com­
placent. There is most certainly a French-
Canadian demographic problem, but it is in the 
anglophone provinces, not in Quebec. The separa­
tion of Quebec, in addition to meaning the set­
ting in of demographic stagnation, would not re­
solve this problem in the least, but on the con­
trary, be absolutely catastrophic for the million 
francophones living in other provinces.13 
One of the major factors which precipitated the current 
crisis in Quebec, according to one authority, is the belief 
that the Québécois are an endangered species. The birthrate in 
Quebec has been declining since 1954, and the population of 
Quebec increased in the period of 1971 to 1974 by only 7 percent 
in natural increase (births over deaths), the lowest rate of any 
province in Canada.However, as one historian wrote, "The 
crisis of the cradle is a major force behind the rise of the 
Parti Québécois and will not be solved, or even ameliorated, 
by a change of government in Quebec. With 300,000 unemployed 
in Quebec in 1977, an increase in the birthrate is not a 
priority need."^^ 
Middle-Class Support for Separation 
According to some observers, Quebec's demands for 
l^ibid., p. 154. 
l^lbid., p. 155. 
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separation are a result of a rising French-Canadian middle 
class. One political scientist states: "Quebec nationalism 
and separatism stem from the frustrations of young French-
speaking managerial and professional people, particularly in 
Montreal, who wish to make their way in modern occupations 
but find advancement not fully possible in English-Canadian 
organizations."^^ Another political scientist offers what 
he calls the "statue inconsistency hypothesis," which states: 
. . . at some initial time, a dominant group A is 
high on achieved and ascribed statuses, and a sub­
ordinate group B is low on both. The mobility 
rate is near zero; there is intragroup status 
consistency and intergroup stability. At a later 
time, as mobility opportunities increase, some 
members of group B rise in achieved, but not as­
cribed status. Though now less absolutely de­
prived, they are more relatively deprived as 
group A becomes the comparison reference. Politi­
cal nationalism, as one of the ideologies that 
legitimate conflict, arises when status inconsis­
tent members of group B enter the power transition 
interval.17 
This middle class wants to bring Quebec fully into the urban, 
industrial, scientific age, but they want this to be done in 
French, according to French-Canadian values, in order to pro­
tect the integrity of French culture in Quebec vis-a-vis the 
rest of Canada. 
During what has come to be known as the Quiet Revolu­
tion, the Liberal party became the political expression of the 
^^Erwin C. Hargrove, "Nationality, values, and change. 
Young Elites in French Canada," Comparative Politics, April 
1970, p. 474. 
17 
Wallace D. Lon, "Nationalist Attitudes in Quebec 
and Belgium," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1975, 
p. 221. 
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new middle class, as witnessed by the bureaucratic revolu­
tion under the forces of modernization. It has been stated: 
"Its election in 1960 publicly consecrated the political 
dominance of the new middle classes in French-Canadian 
society. 
In the early 1960s, French Canadians had become dis­
contented with the English dominance in Quebec. The Lesage 
government began a program calculated to realize the potential 
of French Canada and to ensure the principle of "maîtres chez 
nous." The program included the nationalization of the eleven 
power companies of Quebec and various educational reforms. 
The Lesage government sought to improve the position of the 
French Canadian within the framework of the Canadian federa­
tion. Its purpose was not only that French Canadians should 
have more control over the Quebec economy, but also that the 
French language should secure more recognition in the busi­
ness life of the province. The middle class sought to expand 
its opportunities by opening new areas of employment that had 
been denied to French Canadians because of their language. 
In the view of separatists, total social development 
for French Canada cannot be achieved because it lacks state­
hood. According to Dr. Chaput, "In the same way that complete 
loss of autonomy leads to assimilation, complete possession of 
1 O 
Hubert Guindon, "Two cultures: An essay on National­
ism, Class, and Ethnic Tension," in Contemporary Canada, ed. 
Richard H. Leach (Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1967), 
p. 46. 
19 
autonomy, called independence, leads to the flowering of a 
nation. . . . Quebec's independence will insure our advance­
ment by handing over to us the control of our own destiny. 
Separatists believe the restricted employment opportunities 
of the middle class is a result of their lack of independence. 
However, if Quebec is to achieve independence, the Parti 
Québécois must enlist the support of other groups within 
Quebec, such as the working class. 
Pierre Trudeau, while accepting the view that this 
new middle class is responsible for the Quebec separatist 
movement, has a very different impression of its motives. 
He states: 
The truth is that the separatist counter-revolution 
is the work of a powerless petit-bourgeois minority 
afraid of being left behind by the twentieth-
century revolution. Rather than carving themselves 
out a place in it by ability, they want to make the 
whole tribe return to the wigwams by declaring its 
independence. 20 
Another observer writes that: 
. , . the forces released by Quebec's social revo­
lution cannot achieve results fast enough to keep 
up with burgeoning demands. There must be, it is 
felt, some way to create heaven-on-earth overnight. 
Hostile forces must be at work hindering progress. 
There emerges, therefore, an analysis which is a 
melange of fact and frustration: the relationship 
to English Canada is the barrier to Utopia; politi­
cal independence will clear the way.21 
l^Chaput, op. cit., p. 63. 
20pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Separatist Counter-
Revolutionaries," Canadian Forum, October 1964, p. 78. 
21 
Michael Oliver, "Confederation and Quebec," 
Canadian Forum, October 1963, p. 180. 
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Those advocating federalism believe that French-
speaking Canadians can only maintain their identity by con­
tinued association with the remainder of English Canada, 
According to one political scientist: "One day Quebec will 
understand that it is only in profiting from all the pos­
sibilities of democracy that it will cease to be a permanent 
minority in order to become a minority which, in association 
with other minorities, will be able on particular questions 
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to become a majority." Federalists argue that no matter 
how French Canadians change their political structure, not 
even a declaration of independence, will change the fact 
that French Canadians will always constitute a minority in 
an English-dominated continent. They warn French Canadians 
that separation from Canada will not act as a panacea, but 
in fact will cause French Canadians needless economic harm. 
The Quiet Revolution has, in the view of many ob­
servers, set into motion a process that might result in the 
independence of Quebec. When French merchants and bankers 
went back to France after the English takeover of French 
Canada, they left the French with no one to manage their 
businesses. English bourgeoisie moved in and built up Quebec 
trade and banking. Today, a French bourgeoisie has come into 
existence composed of a modern complex form of executives and 
technicians who will no longer accept English domination. 
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Leon Dion, "The Origin and Character of the Nation­
alism of Growth," Canadian Forum, January 1964, p. 233. 
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The process of urbanization and development of a 
modern economy in Quebec, which has done more than anything 
else to undermine the older form of nationalism, i.e., 
isolationism, has created the pressures which lie behind 
the current independence movement of the Parti Québécois. 
One political scientist writes: 
Cases of conscious discrimination may be few, but 
there is inevitable unconscious discrimination 
since the ways in which the French employee ex­
presses himself are often little understood by 
the English-Canadian superior. The predicament 
is therefore harmful or thought to be harmful 
to French Canadians' chances for promotion. And 
since the entering of a modern economy brings 
along with it the ambition to succeed and the 
normal expectations of rising, it can be a 
dramatic experience for a certain group if on 
entering this particular slot of 20th century 
society they find, or feel they find, the 
avenues closed to them because of a fact about 
themselves which their whole background has 
trained them never to give up, in any circum­
stances.23 
Insofar as they identify themselves as French Canadians, 
the members of Quebec's newly developed middle class are 
bothered by a sense of cultural inferiority in those fields 
that they prize; namely,.industrialization, economic and 
social progress. Trudeau believes that the problems of the 
French Canadian can be best addressed through federalism. 
It has been pointed out, however, that ". . . such is the 
nature of this nationalist sentiment that it is not enough 
that these reforms came about. They must also be brought 
Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political In­
telligentsia: A Case Study," Queen's Quarterly, Spring 1965, 
p. 158. 
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about by the society itself and be purely its own responsi­
bility."^'^ Therefore, the demand is not only for moderniz­
ing reform but for reform carried out by French Canada, and, 
according to one author, . . since this type of reform 
requires an increased intervention by the state, and since 
the state concerned must be identified as a French-Canadian 
state, the logic of the demand leads to the strengthening 
of the state of Quebec, and in the limiting case, indepen-
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dence for the province of Quebec." 
The Parti Québécois, which only ten years ago was a 
splinter group on the fringe of provincial politics, gained 
control of the Quebec provincial government by obtaining 41 
percent of the popular vote in Quebec's 1976 election; enough 
to form a majority government. Soon the government will hold 
a referendum asking the people of Quebec whether or not their 
province should take the first steps toward becoming a new, 
independent North American nation. Although the PQ, has cap­
tured control of the provincial government, its journey has 
only just begun. Independence for Quebec is the PQ's raison 
d'etre and it must convince the rest of its citizens of the 
merits of independence. The main concern here is with the 
political costs of such an action as independence. Even if 
the Parti Québécois could guarantee Quebecers that an inde­
pendent Quebec would survive economically, there still 
^^Ibid., p. 161. 
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remains the question if the people of Quebec will accept the 
demands which independence would entail. An independent 
Quebec is not a panacea to all the problems of the French 
Canadians. As Marcel Chaput states: ". . . you would be 
wrong to think that I consider independence the solution to 
all of Quebec's problems; on the contrary, I believe that it 
would create many more new ones.'"^^ Rather, independence is 
a means of addressing the problems of the French Canadian in 
North America. It is important to note that the political 
separation of Quebec from Canada is a means and not an end 
in itself. A free Quebec would entail a great amount of 
energy and work on the part of the Québécois, but the PQ 
wants a "French solution to Quebec's problems. The question 
remains if the French citizens of Quebec are willing to pay 
such a price, if they believe separation to be worthwhile. 
It is the self-proclaimed job of the Parti Québécois to con­
vince its fellow citizens to strive to obtain this goal. 
In order to understand the phenomenon of the Parti 
Québécois, the historical context of separatist movements 
and the PQ, its party program, and an analysis of its likeli­
hood of success will follow. 
^^Chaput, op. cit., p. v. 
CHAPTER II 
FRENCH CANADIAN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A brief review of French-Canadian history is helpful 
in understanding the position of the Québécois in Canada today. 
Running through English-French Canadian relations are themes 
which have had important consequences on the formation of the 
present separatist movement, namely French-Canadian resistence 
to pressures of assimilation by their English-speaking counter­
parts . 
French colonists founded Quebec in 1608, just one year 
after English colonists established Jamestown. Over 150 years 
later, in 1760, New France (Quebec) was conquered by British 
forces. With the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Great Britain estab­
lished ownership over most of Eastern North America. French 
colonists in Quebec became a conquered people but haVe amazingly 
resisted pressures of assimilation, consciously or unconsciously 
placed upon them. One observer writes: "Unlike the United 
States, Canada has never officially accepted the melting pot 
concept with respect to the various ethnic groups composing 
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the population." If it were not for this will for survival, 
2 7 
John Meisel, "Canadian Parties and Politics," in Con­
temporary Canada, ed. Richard H. Leach (Durham, N.C.; Duke Uni­
versity Press, 1967), pp. 129-30. 
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today's French Canadians would not be able to speak of separa­
tion. In fact, identifying oneself as a French Canadian would 
only be a phenomenon of the past. 
A brief review of the history of French-Canadian rela­
tions with English Canada is important because the origin of 
many current problems of Quebec are a result of this relation­
ship. A survey of the legislation of the British government 
concerning its French-Canadian subjects provides an insight 
into English attitudes. 
Legislative Acts 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 
The details of British policy towards its newly acquired 
colony were outlined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Quebec 
was to be modeled after the other British royal colonies of 
North America. Quebec would observe English laws and be gov­
erned by an elective assembly. The English government hoped 
these provisions would encourage British colonists to settle 
in the newly acquired territory. While the Articles of Quebec's 
Capitulation provided for the free exercise of the Roman Catholic 
religion, the British government assumed, or at least hoped, 
that French Canadians would become assimilated into the British 
way of life. One French Canadian writes: 
The evolution of this new British colony [New France], 
it was felt, would be similar to that of New York, 
first settled by Dutch colonists, and of New Jersey, 
which had been founded by Swedes. In less than a 
century, these two foreign collectivities had melted 
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away. The British conquerors of the St. Lawrence 
Valley sincerely believed that a similar fate awaited 
the Canadians.28 
The aims of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, however, 
did not succeed in bringing about assimilation. One reason 
was that under British law Roman Catholics were ineligible to 
hold office or vote in the assembly. Since French Canadians 
were predominately Catholic, this provision prevented their 
participation in government. 
The language barrier also prevented French-speaking 
Canadians from taking an active part in judicial or legal 
affairs since these were conducted in English. These condi­
tions prevented the assimilation of French Canadians because 
they barred French-speaking members from participation in the 
system. John S. Moir and D. M. L. Farr suggest in their book. 
The Canadian Experience: "Common sense, political realism and 
simple justice to the French Canadians demanded a new constitu­
tion to ensure them membership on juries, protection for 
• 2 9 seigneurial rights, and use of their customary laws." 
Quebec Act of 1774 
A solution for these problems was provided by the Quebec 
Act of 1774. This act restored something similar to that of New 
France's former constitution. A governor would rule through a 
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Michel Brunet, "Historical Background of Quebec's Chal­
lenge to Canadian Unity," in Quebec Society and Politics: Views 
from the Inside, ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart Limited, 1973), p. 40. 
29john S. Moir and D. M. L. Farr, The Canadian Experi­
ence (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), p. 97. 
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council, while the assembly provided for by the Royal Proclama­
tion of 1763 was dismissed. Roman Catholics were now eligible 
to hold public office, even though they were not anywhere else 
in the-- British Empire. The Catholic Church was also given 
legal power to demand payment of the tithe (an assessment of 
one-tenth of the church member's income, which was used to sup­
port the Church and its clergy) and the seigneurs (feudal lords) 
resumed their pre-conquest status. Finally, Quebec was given 
the territory of the Ohio Valley. 
The Quebec Act of 1774 has been called the "... Magna 
30 
Carta of French Canadian national rights and privileges." 
The act removed the anti-French and anti-Catholic bias of ear­
lier British policies. French Canadians were placed on an 
equal political and religious status with the English Canadians. 
As a result French Canadians obtained a means of maintaining 
their identity within the English household of their conquerors. 
It was hoped that the Quebec Act would capture the sup­
port of French Canadians for the British government. This was 
not to be the case. When the thirteen American colonies re­
volted against Britain in 1776, the English government expected 
French Canadians to contribute to its forces in the campaign to 
suppress the uprising. Although French Canadians refused to 
support the American colonists, they were equally unwilling to 
fight for the British cause. Thus the Quebec Act, like the Royal 
F. C. Stanley, "Act or Pact? Another Look at Con­
federation," in Confederation, Ramsay Cook et al. (Toronto; 
University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 96. 
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Proclamation of 1763 before it, failed to produce a feeling of 
French-Canadian loyalty to the British Empire. 
Although the Quebec Act ensured the protection of French 
Canadian fights, it was aimed at strengthening the ties between 
her and Great Britain. The approach employed by the English 
government had changed since 1763, but the end remained the 
same: to make French Canadians fit the fabric of their English 
counterparts. 
Not only did the American Revolution result in the inde­
pendence of the English colonies, but it also destroyed the 
basic assumption underlying the Quebec Act: that the province 
of Quebec would remain French in character. As a result of the 
revolution, many English colonists from America who remained 
loyal to the British crown (United Empire Loyalists) fled to 
Quebec. These new arrivals were predominately English Protestants 
and wanted the British government to enact new policies which 
would be more in line with their customs rather than those of 
the French. English Canadians, now in closer contact with the 
French, sought to restructure the government. 
Constitutional Act of 1791 
The answer to these demands was provided by the Constitu­
tional Act of 1791. According to the provisions of this act, 
Canada was politically divided into two colonies--Upper (English) 
and Lower (French) Canada. Both were given elective assemblies, 
reversing the decision of the Quebec Act of 1774. Thus French 
and English could live under their own divergent customs. 
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Once again it seemed the British government had assured 
the French the right to maintain their unique identity by allow­
ing them to choose their own elective assembly, but this was not 
the case. The Constitutional Act attempted to weaken the 
strength of the Catholic Church by establishing Anglicanism as 
the state religion. An Anglican bishop was appointed to Quebec 
and one-eighth of the Crown lands was to be reserved as an en­
dowment for the support of the Protestant clergy. 
However, the main consequence of the Constitutional Act 
was not anglicization but the renewal of the French Canadian 
separateness. The Act provided French Canadians with a geo­
graphical as well as a political base. One observer writes: 
"If the Quebec Act of 1774 guaranteed the survival of the French 
Canadians, the Constitutional Act of 1791 guaranteed the sur-
31 
vival of French Canada." The granting of an Assembly to Lower 
Canada provided a major force in the development of the colony's 
political development. Another French Canadian observer writes; 
"Once given the vote and admitted to the assembly (privileges 
denied to Roman Catholics, in Britain until 1829) , the French 
Canadians dispelled any notions of their political indifference 
or ineptness by quickly learning to use the parliamentary system 
3 2 
for their own ends." Though the Act provided for the estab­
lishment of a predominately British colony (Upper Canada), more 
31 
^^Ibid., p. 98. 
3 2 Moir and Farr, op. cit., p. 111. 
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importantly for the future of the French Canadians it assured 
them of la. survivance. As was the case with the Quebec Act of 
1774, the Constitutional Act gave French Canadians a means by 
which they could protect their unique culture. 
Revolt and the Durham Report 
Although both French and English colonists had acquired 
an assembly form of government, one problem still plagued both 
groups; the desires of the colonists could not be imposed on 
the executives. Britain still retained the power to appoint 
the executives of each colony and therefore had the final word 
in decision making for the colonies. In other words, the colo­
nies had a representative but not a responsible (cabinet) gov­
ernment. Upper and Lower Canada were ruled by local oligarchies. 
In Upper Canada this group was known as the "Family Compact" and 
in Lower Canada its equivalent was the Chateau Clique. The 
French Canadians of Lower Canada had greater reason for concern 
since the Chateau Clique was disproportionately dominated by 
English-speaking Canadians. 
In 1837, rebellion erupted in both Upper and Lower 
Canada as a result of the English government's failure to heed 
the Canadian colony's demands for elective councils. The 
British Parliament issued its Ten Resolutions of 1837 to this 
effect, which in turn sparked the revolt. 
Other factors were also responsible for this outbreak 
of violence. Groups in Upper Canada felt the economic progress 
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of their province was being stifled by French-Canadian dominance. 
The more business-minded English Canadian believed that the 
isolationist-minded French Canadians were a detriment. Also, 
a recession had struck the colonies in 1836, along with crop 
failures in the Montreal-Richelieu area. Thus political, eco­
nomic and racial problems combined to fuel the rebellion. 
Although the rebellion was suppressed without much dif­
ficulty, it prompted an investigation by the British government 
into the problems of the colonists. The recommendations of that 
study, the Durham Report, demonstrate that the British govern­
ment had not given up attempts to assimilate the French-speaking 
Canadians, even though provisions of previous acts had given 
FrenrcJi^anadians cultural guarantees and geographical sovereignty. 
John George Lambton, first Earl of Durham, was sent by 
the English government to ascertain the problems of the Canadian 
colonies and make recommendations. On January 31, 1839, the 
Durham Report was released. It recommended the concession of 
effective self-government to be granted to the Canadians, the 
very measure which the colonists were demanding. "But if Dur­
ham favored self-government (or what is known in our history as 
responsible) it was only for government dominated by English-
speaking people. It was the old policy of assimilation all 
33 
over again," writes one historian. A legislative union of 
the two Canadas would be formed with the hope that the combined 
F. C. Stanley, op. cit., p. 99. 
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English-speaking majority in the two provinces would ensure the 
English domination of the colonies. 
Understandably, the Report caused a wave of negative 
reaction among French Canadians. Although a major proposal of 
the Durham Report would provide a means for English domination 
of the French, its actual effect was to strengthen the efforts 
of French Canadians to protect their identity. According to 
one author, Durham's biggest mistake was based upon, ". . . 
this . . . miscalculation . . . that the French could be angli­
cized, that eighty years of British encouragement to French-
Canadian nationalism could be reversed by a mere political 
J • • ii34 decision." 
When Britain first obtained control of New France in 
1763, it followed a policy of leniency and toleration. As time 
went on, the British government gave more authority to the 
French Canadians in an attempt to ensure their loyalty to the 
Empire, especially during the period of the American Revolution. 
Thus outside forces, such as the fear of revolt spreading from 
the American colonies to those in Canada, and the American in­
vasion of 1812 to 1814, were as much responsible for the conces­
sions to the French as was the concern for protection of their 
French culture. Within each measure enacted concerning the 
French Canadians was the assumption that French-speaking Cana­
dians would be co-opted into the culture of their English-
speaking contemporaries. 
^^Moir and Farr, op. cit., p. 147, 
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These actions demonstrate the misunderstanding which 
the British government possessed concerning their new subjects, 
French Canadians, above all else, have been concerned with 
protecting their unique cultural and racial identity. They 
gladly took advantage of those measures granted them by the 
English Parliament which they could utilize to protect their 
culture; for example, French language guarantees a government 
by an elected assembly. French Canadians utilized such mea­
sures to remain distinct from the rest of English Canada. The 
belief that all this could be changed by an act of government 
illustrates how naive the English government was concerning 
their French subjects. 
Act of Union of 1840 
The English government once again attempted to anglicize 
French Canadians by passing the Act of Union of 1840. When 
Britain acquired New France, it numbered less than the French 
Canadians in Canada. As time passed, many English came to feel 
their French counterparts were stifling their economic develop­
ment. French Canadians were less interested in agricultural 
and industrial growth than were the English. Thus English 
Canadians sought a political arrangement to circumvent the 
power of French Canada. The Act of Union seemed to provide 
the best solution. The English government felt that. 
The only way to defeat the French majority would be 
to crib, cabin, and confine it to Lower Canada; and 
this could best be done by preserving as distinct, 
political entities the two provinces which had been 
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proposed to obliterate and by giving each of them 
equal representation in the new legislature.35 
Upper and Lower Canada were reunited and Upper Canada, despite 
its smaller population, was given equal representation with 
Lower Canada. Upper Canada's high public debt was also trans­
ferred to Lower Canada. Finally, English was to be the 
only official language. 
Understandably, most members of Lower Canada viewed 
the Act of Union with hostility. They resented their reduced 
representation, the burden of Upper Canada's debt, and the ob­
vious anglicizing purposes of the Act. Ironically, this 
blatant attempt of "enforced Anglicization" was later to back­
fire against the English when the English population surpassed 
the number of French Canadians. The advantage thus shifted to 
the French Canadians who, although they were now a numerical 
minority, still possessed equal representation vis-a-vis the 
English Canadians. 
The Union lasted only twenty-five years and .ended amidst 
cries of "No Popery" and "No French Domination" -- slogans of 
the Clear Grits Party of Canada West (Upper Canada) who were 
upset that French Canadians, now comprising a minority, held 
equal representation with the English-speaking Canadian ma­
jority. Now that English Canadians comprised a majority, they 
sought once again to change the political system so that it 
would be more advantageous to their interests. One author 
writes : 
F. C. Stanley, op. cit., p. 100. 
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Canada East's (French Canada) equal voice in the 
united parliament not only enabled it to stall 
progressive measures that Canada West deemed 
necessary, but even to impose its solution to 
Canada West's problems, as in the case of sepa­
rate school legislation. Within the Union the 
two Canadas were equal partners politically, 
but Canada West, now larger in population and more 
dynamic complained of French domination and of 
minority rule.36 
British North America Act 
The late 1860s have been described as a period of 
stalemate between French and English Canadians. Several solu­
tions were proposed, each aiming at solving the problem of 
French and English political relations. The existence of a 
strong French-Canadian minority continued to make its presence 
felt in the decisions of Canada. 
The Clear Grits Party ("all sand and no dirt - clear 
grit all the way through"), under the leadership of Toronto 
journalist George Brown, advocated the principle of "representa­
tion by population." This policy sought to minimize the power 
of French Canadians who had become a numerical minority since 
the passage of the Act of Union in 1840, According to one 
political analyst: 
Grittism began with a demand for simple, economical 
government and an extension of elective institu­
tions on the American model. After George Brown, 
the publisher of the Toronto Globe, joined the 
movement, it took on a pronounced anti-Catholic 
tone. The fact that Upper Canada was growing 
more rapidly than Lower Canada but that the two 
sections had equal representation in the legislature 
^^Moir and Farr, op. cit., p. 207. 
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gave the Grits a grievance which they exploited 
to the full in the cry for 'Representation by 
Population.' Against Macdonald - Cartier con­
servatism, which it declared to be a corrupt 
alliance of the Roman Catholic Church with the 
Bank of Montreal and the Grant Trunk Railway, 
the Globe championed the interests of 'the intel­
ligent yeomanry of Upper Canada,' and at the same 
time supported the claims of Toronto as a com­
mercial and transportation centre against Mon­
treal . 37 
The demand for "Rep. by Pop." was vigorously opposed 
by French Canadians, who regarded the proposal as nothing less 
than an attempt to destroy French institutions and French 
rights in Canada. 
The Clear Grits Party became one of the most dynamic 
movements in Canadian politics, driven by the issue of equal 
representation between Canada East and West. How could the 
representation of Canada East and Canada West remain the same 
while the upper province contributed two-thirds of the revenue 
and seemed destined by 1861 to out-distance the lower province 
in wealth and population? The Clear Grits Party objected to 
the wasteful duplication of expenditures, the "intolerable 
domination" of Canada East in forcing separate schools upon 
the upper province in defiance of the Globe's crusade against 
"state-churchism," and other evidences of the "subordination" 
which would continue to grow increasingly irksome with every 
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cause. 
Frank H. Underbill, "Political Parties and Ideas," 
in Canada, ed. George W. Brown (Berkeley: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1950), p. 334. 
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In 1861, Canada West voted 40 to 9 to break the equality 
of representation in the Canadian union and in 1864 a resolution 
to maintain that equality "inviolate" was lost in the House by a 
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vote of 82 to 24. English Canadians demanded change. 
John Sandfield Macdonald promoted the "double majority 
principle." This would ensure that no legislation could be 
passed for one section of the province without the approval of 
the majority of that section, thus restricting government mea­
sures to those which could command a majority in both sections 
of the province. This concept was deemed unacceptable because 
it was believed that it would tend to promote sectionalism and 
was counter to the institution of responsible government. 
A federal solution was campaigned for mainly by John S. 
Macdonald, A source of continuing conflict between Quebec and 
Ottawa had been the difference of opinion between French and 
English Canadians as to the purpose of the federation. Finally, 
the alternative of separation of French and English Canada 
existed. Outside forces, though, made this alternative unattrac­
tive to both parties; namely, the fear of domination by the 
United States. 
Each of these proposed solutions attempted to solve 
the French-Canadian problem. English-speaking Canadians were 
more concerned with establishing themselves in a position of 
political dominance than in respecting the rights of the French 
minority. French Canadians, on the other hand, sought to pro­
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tect their unique culture. Federalism seemed to offer the only 
acceptable solution to both sides. 
The stalemate was broken by "the great coalition" of 
1864. George Brown and the Grits entered into a coalition 
ministry with their arch enemy Macdonald, described by one his­
torian as: "... a tribute to the patriotism of George Brown. 
For him it meant the virtual wrecking of a party of which he 
had served as leader for many years.Brown sought to pre­
vent a split between the two Canadas because he wished to 
maintain the British connection and wanted to promote the west­
ward expansion of Canada. For both of these the continued 
association of the Canadas in the St. Lawrence system was im­
perative. Although this coalition did not last long, Brown's 
conduct made possible Canadian federation which in turn resulted 
in an entirely new alignment in Canadian political life. 
Divergent French and English expectations concerning the 
value and purpose of confederation underlie the current problems 
between Quebec and Ottawa today. The continuing belief of the 
English Canadian, since the conquest in 1763 up to the Federa­
tion of 1867, that French Canadians would eventually become 
assimilated demonstrates their lack of understanding of the 
French Canadian. 
English Canadians sought to establish a strong central 
government which would enable them to expand economically 
^^Carl Frederick Wittke, A History of Canada (New York: 
F. S. Crofts and Company, 1942), p. 181. 
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without the crippling opposition of any one province, 
specifically Quebec. Improvement of railway communications 
and westward expansion were examples of the developments 
sought by English-speaking Canadians. The political impasse 
which had developed between French and English Canadians 
under the Act of Union prevented English businessmen from 
developing such interests as these as quickly as they would 
have preferred. 
French Canadians sought a weak central government, 
contrary to what English Canadians hoped for in confederation. 
Their main concern was to prevent the centralizing tendencies 
of a federation from usurping their authority and therefore 
threatening the survival of their French culture. French Cana­
dians did agree to join the federation despite this fear be­
cause they felt more secure in an alliance with Britain rather 
than their neighbor, the United States. At least with the 
British they had extracted guarantees, such as protection of 
their language rights, while many feared the assimilative 
powers of the American democracy. 
Ramsay Cook commented on the divergent views of the 
French and English Canadians, saying that, "Confederation has 
never held, for French Canadians, the same all-important place 
in the nation's history as it has for English Canadians. In­
deed, some French-Canadian nationalist writers have viewed 
Confederation not as a triumph, but rather as a tragedy for 
40 
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their people." Many French Canadians at the time felt they 
had little choice. An observer states: "Every pro-confederate 
French-Canadian speaker in the Canadian debate used lurid 
colours to depict the end of 1^ survivance, of the 'French fact' 
in North America, if Canada were to be swallowed by the 'uni­
versal democracy' of the American Republic.G. E. Cartier, 
who helped persuade French Canadians to join the federation, 
said: "Absorption in conformist American democracy would cer­
tainly follow if the fabric of a new national state were not 
woven in the north.Still, many suspected the proposed 
federation as a plot to revive the anglicizing goals of Durham 
under a new disguise. Even today some French-Canadian nation­
alist leaders feel Cartier committed the original vendu (he 
sold out the French-Canadian interest). 
Canada's federation, therefore, was partly established 
as a result of negative considerations. Both groups sought to 
protect themselves, but survival involved different considera­
tions for each group. As one historian states: "For English-
speaking central Canadians, survival meant expansion and accumu­
lating sufficient strength to resist continentalism. For most 
French Canadians survival meant guarding their language, religion 
and laws in the region they already occupied. 
4lRamsay Cook et al., éd.. Confederation (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. x. 
^^Kenneth McNaught, The History of Canada (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 133. 
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Assimilation, though, was not the objective of the 
British North America Act. Protection of provincial rights 
is a major facet of its provisions. The B.N.A. Act explicitly 
guaranteed the rights of the French language and the establish­
ment of separate schools for French-speaking Canadians. It has 
been noted that, because of French Canadian wariness of assimi­
lation: "What ever else Canadian federalism might mean, it was 
clear that it had to be free from any reasonable suspicion of 
being a device to bring about the assimilation of French 
4 S 
Canada. ..." 
The British North America Act went into effect July 1, 
1867. Such provisions as the power of disallowance and assign­
ment of residual powers to the central government seemed to 
insure the dominance of the central government. According to 
the B.N.A. Act, any provincial legislation may be disallowed by 
the Governor-General-in-Council within one year of its receipt 
by the Federal government. Thus the cabinet has the power to 
render inoperative and void any provincial act, for any reason 
which may seem fitting to the federal government. Examples of 
reason for its use include contrary to sound principles of 
legislation, ultra vires, unjust, and discriminatory. 
However, this was not to be the case, largely as a re­
sult of the decisions of the Judicial Branch of the British 
Privy Council, which acted as the final appellate court for 
^^F. R. Scott, "French-Canada and Canadian Federalism," 
in Evolving Canadian Federalism, A. R. M. Lower et al. (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 61. 
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Canada from 1890 until 1949, Cases involving disputes be­
tween the central government and the provinces were consis­
tently decided in favor of the provincial governments. As 
a result, power was shifted from the central government to 
its provincial counterparts. 
Increasing Federal Power 
Recently the Canadian federal government has gained 
more power relative to the provinces mainly as a result of 
World Wars One and Two and the Depression of the 1930s. Be­
cause of the extraordinary burdens these events placed upon 
Canada, the provinces surrendered many of their powers, for 
example, taxation authority, to enable Canada to deal more 
effectively with these crises. 
Today many provinces, including Quebec, have diffi­
culty in meeting their responsibilities because of a lack of 
revenue. As a result they are forced to rely upon grants and 
subsidies from the federal government to meet their obligations. 
Accompanying these funds are regulations imposed by the central 
government upon the recipient. 
French Canadians of Quebec are extremely unhappy with 
this situation. Because of their deep concern for protecting 
their unique customs and language, they have sought to prevent 
as much outside "interference" as possible. The provincial 
government of Quebec has adopted the role as protector of French 
Canadian culture in Canada, which was once occupied by the 
Catholic Church, and therefore the provincial government of 
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Quebec has resisted what they feel is federal usurption of 
their provincial governmental power. 
An example of this behavior was the rule of Quebec's 
Premier Maurice Duplessis. He rejected all national plans 
that were based on a uniform treatment of the provinces, in­
cluding the programs of the post-1945 tax rental agreements, 
the Trans-Canada Highway project, and federal aid to univer­
sities. 
For most of their history of association with English 
Canadians, French-speaking Canadians have remained isolated 
within the province of Quebec in hopes of protecting their way 
of life. They only became involved in Canadian national poli­
cies which directly affected them. Because of this isolation, 
English Canadians in the past have not been very concerned with 
their French-Canadian counterparts. More importantly, it has 
resulted in the formation of unfavorable stereotypes of the 
French. Only the writings of extreme ultra-national groups 
received attention in English Canada. More moderate groups 
are seldom heard. English-Canadian attitudes towards their 
French citizens have been shaped mainly by memories of French-
Canadian opposition, for example, the Conscription Crisis of 
1914. 
English Canadians are also partly to blame for this 
lack of understanding. According to one writer, the English 
". . . believed that they were innately superior to all 
'foreigners', and particularly to foreigners who did not 
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speak English or spoke it with an accent to them."^^ 
As this brief review has shown, most of French-Canadian 
history has been devoted to resisting the pressures of English-
Canadian assimilation. French Canadians have utilized those 
opportunities which enabled them to sustain their unique culture, 
such as the Quebec Act of 1774 which placed French Canadians on 
an equal political and religious status with the English Canadi­
ans, the Constitutional Act of 1791 which provided a geographi­
cal as well as a political base for the French, and the Act of 
Union of 1840 which later provided them with equal representa­
tion even though they were to become a minority. ,It was through 
this defensive nationalism that French Canadians sought to main­
tain their identity. 
French-Canadian Nationalism 
Today, French Canadians are no longer willing to defer 
to the present English-dominated Canadian federal government. 
A new sense of nationalism has permeated the Québécois prompt­
ing some even to seek separation from the Canadian federation. 
One study conducted by a group of scholars, the Canada 70 Team, 
found that: 
Today he [the French Canadian] understands. And his 
understanding is this, he is not, in fact, a minority 
within the framework or the country of Canada but 
rather one of two majorities. French Canadians have 
^^Mason Wade, Canadian Dualism (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 11. 
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awakened to this fact that they have political 
power as a homogeneous people with a territory 
and a government of their own.4? 
Bilingualism Policy 
In the 1960s, the central government became concerned 
with the bilingual and bicultural problems in response to 
French Canadian demands. They sought to strengthen the con­
cept of an equal partnership between the two founding races. 
In 1963, L. B. Pearson established a royal commission directed 
by Andre Laurendeau and A. D, Dunton, the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, to investigate the current 
state of bilingualism and biculturalism and to recommend steps 
to strengthen the concept. In analyzing Canadian attitudes 
towards the bicultural problem the Commission concluded: 
The chief protagonists, whether they are entirely 
conscious of it or not, are French-speaking Quebec 
and English-speaking Canada. And it seems to us 
to be no longer the traditional conflict between 
a majority or minority. It is rather a conflict 
between two majorities: that which is a majority' 
in all of Canada, and that which is a majority 
in the entity of Quebec. 
That is to say, French-speaking Quebec acted 
for a long time as though at least it had accepted 
the idea of being merely a privileged "ethnic mi­
nority." Today, the kind of opinion we met so 
often in the province regards Quebec practically 
as an autonomous society, and expects her to be 
recognized as one. 
This attitude goes back to a fundamental ex­
pectation for French Canada, that is, to be an 
equal partner with English-speaking Canada. If 
this idea is found to be impossible, because such 
^^Canada 70 Team, Quebec, The Threat of Separation 
(Toronto; McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1969), p. 142. 
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equality is not believed in or is not acceptable, we 
believe the sense of deception will bring decisive 
consequences. An important element in French-
speaking Quebec is already tempted to go it alone. 
Incompleteness of bilingualism is a source of irrita­
tion for Quebecers. Yet any extension of the use of the 
French language annoys certain groups in the other English-
speaking provinces. One English Canadian writes: 
However well-intentioned, the move to save Confed­
eration by attempting to implement a policy of 
official bilingualism was doomed from the very 
start by the failure of its proponents to recognize 
one vital fact, Canada is not a single state in­
habited by two principal peoples, spread across the 
land. . . . Instead, Canada is divided geographi­
cally into two entirely regional cultures, the 
attempt to introduce the alien language into each 
of the regions is bound to be unwelcomed and, in 
the cause of the English-speaking section which 
constitutes the vast majority of Canada, totally 
impractical.49 
Others oppose the policy of bilingualism for different 
reasons. According to one writer, bilingualism ". . . sancti­
fies the separation much more than doing away with it."^^ Dr. 
Marcel Chaput, on the other hand, believes bilingualism is 
". . . a meaningless word, a sin against nature,that French 
Canadians are, "... shut up in the vicious circle of 
^^John S. Moir and D. M. L. Farr, The Canadian Experi­
ence (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), pp. 562-563. 
^^James B. Lamb, The Other Canada (Windsor, Nova 
Scotia: Lancelot Press Limited, 1972), p. 118. 
^^Fernand Dumont, The Vigil of Quebec (Toronto: Uni­
versity of Toronto Press, 1971), p. ix. 
^^Marcel Chaput, Why I Am A Separatist (Toronto: The 
Ryerson Press, 1961), p. 19. 
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destructive bilingualism." Many separatists fear that 
bilingualism will only lead to assimilation, that in claim­
ing that French Canadians have rights throughout Canada, 
English Canadians seek only to disperse French Canadians 
from Quebec and thereby assimilate them. According to Rene 
Levesque: ". . . instead of strengthening Quebec, they talk 
of a revival of French-Canada outside our borders. Let us 
say very, very calmly: what they are proposing to us now is 
5 3 
a sucker's game. ..." 
According to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism Report: 
Whenever a bilingual state preserves the integrity 
of its language groups, the tensions that might 
arise are neutralized to the extent that each of 
the groups within the state has a sense of cultural 
security. When a country fails to provide this 
sense of cultural security, the minority, seeing 
its language threatened, often tends to harbour 
feelings of hostility toward the majority and to 
look for other solutions, including various forms 
of 'national' self-determination outside the frame­
work of the bilingual state.54 
It is this lack of cultural security which is spurring many 
French Canadians toward separatism. Many French Canadians 
feel that the central government's policy of bilingualism 
is only an attempt to achieve assimilation. 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau disagrees. He writes: 
52 
Chaput, op. cit., p. viii. 
^^Rene Levesque, An Option for Quebec (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 84. 
^^Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 
Report, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 14. 
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I am afraid that excessive preoccupation with the 
future of the language has made certain people 
f o r g e t  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  m a n  s p e a k i n g  i t  . . .  n o  
constitutional reform - indeed not even a declara­
tion of independence could make French a major lan­
guage of business and industry in North America, 
or make Quebec a state capable of dictating its 
terms to the rest of the continent.55 
Precisely because French Canadians are such a small minority 
in Canada, as well as in North America, Trudeau feels they 
cannot enclose themselves within Quebec. Rather, Prime Min­
ister Trudeau writes, ". . . Canadian federalism is ideal. 
The federal system obliges Quebec's political culture to stand 
the test of competition at the federal level, while allowing 
Quebec to choose the form of government best suited to its 
needs at the provincial level. 
Trudeau and those who advocate the federal system feel 
that the only way French Canadians can survive and prosper in 
their minority status is to compete with the rest of North 
America in which they are destined to live. Trudeau, however, 
acknowledges that, "... the whole citizenry must be made to 
feel that it is only within the framework of the federal state 
that their language, culture, institutions, sacred traditions, 
and standard of living can be protected from external attack 
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and internal strife." 
^^Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French 
Canadians (Toronto: Macmillin of Canada, 1968), pp. 7-8. 
S^ibid., p. 33. 
S^Ibid., p. 193. 
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Thus the stage is set between the federalists and 
those advocating political separation for Quebec. Separatists 
believe that federalism is an obsolete political framework 
which does not represent the best interests of the people of 
Quebec. Within this environment of political dissatisfaction, 
the Parti Québécois has risen to power. The circumstances of 
its formation and development is important in assessing its 
future. 
CHAPTER III 
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PARTI QUEBECOIS 
The call for political independence for the province 
of Quebec is not a new phenomenon. Ever since Britain's vic­
tory over the French in 1760, some French Canadians have 
argued for the independence of Quebec. 
Separatism and World War I 
In 1917, during Canada's participation in the First 
World War, violence broke out between French and English Cana­
dians. During the course of the war, French Canadian enlist­
ments, which were never high, began to dwindle. There were 
many reasons for this: the overwhelmingly English nature of 
the armed forces, the lack of French Canadians, and the belief 
that it was a war to preserve the British Empire. French Cana­
dians, who had been cut off from Europe since 1759, were not 
as anxious as English Canadians, many of whom had just arrived 
from England, to fight in defense of Britain. More and more 
enlistments were needed as the war continued. In an effort to 
prevent the need for conscription, French-Canadian leaders, 
such as Laurier and the Catholic Church hierarchy, campaigned 
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for the French to volunteer. Finally, in 1918, the federal 
government felt that conscription was necessary and Prime 
Minister Borden announced that it would soon be initiated. 
The reaction in Quebec included riots, attacks on pro-
government newspapers, and mass demonstrations. 
During this period, the Deputy of Lotbiniere of the 
Legislative Assembly (the former name of the National Assembly) 
proposed the expiration of the federal pact of 1867 in order 
to take Quebec out of the federation, , . if the other pro­
vinces find that Quebec is an obstacle to the union, to the 
5 8 
progress and development of Canada." Although the proposi­
tion was not carried out, the idea of political independence 
had once again been introduced. Fortunately, the war soon 
ended and the crisis was over for the time being. However, 
the memory of the conflict still remained and would fuel bit­
ter feelings on both sides in future disagreements. 
Separatist sentiments arose again in 1939. The news­
paper La Nation published a letter by Lionel Grouix, who advo­
cated the idea of provoking the dismemberment of Canada. The 
chief editor of La Nation, Pierre Chaloult, declared in his 
5 9 
editorial: "It is understood, we are separatists!" La Na­
tion declared itself an instrument for the movement of politi­
cal separation for Quebec. 
CO y 
Quebec en Bref, "l'évolution of independanisme 
dequis soixante ans," July 1977, p. 4. 
52 
On March 6, 1937, Quebecers read in Le Devoir an 
article by Georges Pelletier entitled "Confederation? - Cana­
dian Republic? - French Free State?" That same year Lostaler 
O'Leary published his book, Separatism, a Constructive Doc­
trine . 
Separatism and World War II 
New difficulties arose between the two linguistic 
groups during the Second World War and again revolved around 
the issue of conscription. When Canada entered the Second 
World War in 1939, Prime Minister Mackenzie King did not want 
to prompt the recurrence of the 1917 crisis and hence he 
promised not to institute conscription. The demands of total 
war, though, soon outran voluntary enlistment just as it had 
done in World War One. The Conservative opposition and other 
elements, including the military, demanded that conscription 
be enacted. Prime Minister King, in order to avoid another 
full-scale crisis, sought a national referendum to permit the 
government to back out of. its promise to French Canada. The 
referendum proved to be a disaster, French Canadian groups 
such as La Ligue pour la defense du Canada, supported by the 
lower clergy, campaigned for a non vote, although this action 
was contrary to the wishes of the politicians and the upper 
hierarchy of the Catholic Church. In the eight English-
speaking provinces the vote went 80 percent in favor of the 
referendum; in Quebec it was 72 percent against and among 
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French Canadians in Quebec the non vote rose to 85 percent. 
Opposition to the war in Quebec was polarized by the campaign 
and statements on each side grew more bitter. ^ Ligue grew 
stronger and became a political party; the Bloc Populaire. 
The government managed to avoid imposing conscription 
until 1944, when it finally appeared that King could no longer 
satisfy both English and French sections of the party and 
country. French-Canadian leaders realized that it would be 
better to have limited conscription under King than full con­
scription under the English-dominated government that would 
replace him should his government fall. Although a full-scale 
crisis was avoided, again an air of mistrust remained between 
French and English Canadians. Fortunately, the war was by now 
almost over and it did not become necessary to send any of the 
draftees into battle. 
Maurice Duplessis and French-
Canadian Nationalism 
French nationalism found expression in the formation of 
the Quebec provincial party, L'Union Nationale, led by Maurice 
Duplessis. Duplessis was elected in 1936 on a program of 
provincial rights and opposition to the federal government and 
English-owned business. With the sole exception of 1939 this 
appeal led him to victory in every election until 1958, During 
^^Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian 
Political System. Environment, Structure, and Process (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1976), p. 70. 
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his administration, conflict frequently arose between the 
federal government and Quebec, usually with the province pro­
testing against alleged encroachments on provincial jurisdic­
tion, especially concerning federal anti-depression measures. 
According to one author: "This institutionalization of French-
English conflict was important in keeping some sort of re­
straint on French-English relations during most of the 
Duplessis period.With the exception of the 1944 conscrip­
tion crisis, the most visible expressions of the English-
French cleavage were arguments which broke out in federal-
provincial conferences and the speeches of Duplessis which 
attacked the federal government. 
Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution 
The immediate postwar period and the 1950s was a time 
of apparent calm in Quebec, except for the occasional attacks 
of Maurice Duplessis against the federal government. However, 
things were not as calm as they seemed. Quebec society had 
been going through a period of rapid urbanization and indus­
trialization and Quebecers were becoming more and more dis­
turbed with the growing economic dominance of the English 
Canadians, both within and outside Quebec. 
What has come to be known as the Quiet Revolution 
started with the death of Maurice Duplessis in 1959. His suc­
cessors were unable to establish the tight control that he had 
Ibid., p. 69, 
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been able to establish over Quebec. In 1960, the Union 
Nationale was finally defeated by the Liberal Party, lead by 
Jean Lesage, under the campaign slogan, maîtres chez nous 
(Masters in our own house). Lesage advocated "positive 
Québécois nationalism" rather than the negative policies 
of Duplessis.^^ The Lesage administration favored expanded 
government participation in the economic affairs of Quebec, 
which included the nationalization of eleven power companies 
with the formation of Quebec Hydro. Rene Levesque, at the 
time Minister of Natural Resources, was instrumental in na­
tionalizing Quebec's hydroelectric power. 
The purpose of this nationalization was not only to 
achieve more control over the Quebec economy, but also to en­
sure the recognition of the French language in the business 
/ 
life of the province. Commenting on the nationalization, Rene 
Levesque wrote: 
Our long-range and not-so-long range objective is to 
take over the economic life of Montreal as of the 
rest of the province on the basis of something com­
parable to what we represent in the province because 
people are more important than business, and as 
people we are 80 percent. And no self-respecting 
people in the world ever accept to be something 
like a servant in his own homeland.63 
The Lesage administration also advocated greater gov­
ernmental participation in education. The Department of 
Bartlet Brebner, Canada (Ann Arbor; The University 
of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 544. 
G^ibid., p. 545. 
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Education was reorganized and unified, with the consequent 
transfer of responsibility for education from the church to 
the state. Government control over the universities was also 
increased. During Lesage's administration, Quebec's annual 
budget grew from 600 million to over two billion dollars; 
health, education, and welfare replaced roads and agriculture 
as top priorities.Lesage also proposed the improvement of 
the position of the French within the federal framework. The 
forces of separatism, however, were making their presence felt. 
Starting with a pamphlet called Pourquoi je suis séparatiste 
by Marcel Chaput, a disaffected scientist with the federal 
Defense Research Board, and carrying on with a wave of terror­
ism under the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), separatism 
gained in strength in Quebec. Marcel Chaput writes: "In short, 
we want independence for Quebec because it would represent 
liberation, internationalism and a springboard into the whole 
world, whereas present Confederation, from our minority, means 
isolation and stagnation. 
In the election of June 5, 1966, the Lesage administra­
tion was defeated by Daniel Johnson's Union Nationale. However, 
during this time, an important group of Quebecers felt the need 
^^Andre Larocque, "Political Institutions and Quebec 
Society," in Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the In­
side , ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1973), p. 78. 
^^Marcel Chaput, Why I am a Separatist (Toronto: 
The Ryerson Press, 1961), p. 19. 
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to alter the trend of Quebec nationalism. According to an 
observer : 
Some of the prime intellectual movers of the Quiet 
Revolution, notably Pierre Elliot Trudeau and his 
closest associates, became concerned that the com­
bination of head-strong Quebec nationalism and 
Ottawa's highly pragmatic flexibility was eroding 
the federal system. They determined to enter fed­
eral politics in the November, 1965, elections to 
halt this process, and make Ottawa a more effective 
counterweight to Quebec C i t y , 6 6  
The Union Nationale 
Some observers have stated that the Union Nationale's 
victory of 1966 was a result of outdated electoral laws which 
favored rural areas.Others think the surprise defeat of the 
Liberal government was a popular reaction against the Quiet 
Revolution and a return to the gloomy conditions that had 
marked earlier Union Nationale administrations. This was not 
the case. The electoral statistics indicate that the public 
gave less support to the Union Nationale in 1966 than in 1962. 
Its share of the vote dropped from 42.1 percent to 40.9 percent, 
while the Liberal share fell from 56.4 percent to 47.2 percent. 
Therefore, the Union Nationale did not defeat the Liberal 
administration by taking away its electoral strength, the outcome 
was rather a result of the efforts of two separatist parties, the 
Ralliement National (RN) and the Rassemblement pour 1'Independence 
^^Dale C. Thomson, Quebec Society and Politics: Views 
from the Inside (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973) , 
p. 15. 
G^Ibid., p. 16. 
G^Larocque, op. cit., p. 78. 
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Nationale (RIN). Together these two parties captured 8 percent 
of the popular vote and brought about the defeat of Liberal 
candidates in a number of constituencies. "Yet," writes a 
political scientist, "these two parties, particularly the RIN, 
were dedicated to speeding up the Quiet Revolution, not to 
stopping it. Their goal was not to retard the construction 
of a national state in Quebec, but, on the contrary, to de-
6 9 
velop it as an independent national entity." 
Daniel Johnson died in October 1968, leaving observers 
wondering if he had promoted separation or continued federation. 
At the Dominion-Provincial Conference on February 6, 1968, 
Johnson proposed a "special status" for Quebec, which Justice 
Minister Trudeau opposed. Jean-Jacques Bertrand, Johnson's 
successor and a committed federalist, was defeated in the 
1970 elections by the Liberal Party under the leadership of 
Robert Bourassa. 
Bourassa 
Bourassa wanted a strong Quebec, but one that would 
remain within the Canadian federation. He devoted his admin­
istration to solving Quebec's problems through financial and 
economic means rather than legal formulas. Bourassa argued 
that separatism would destroy the economy of Quebec and 
^^Ibid., p. 79. 
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drastically alter the standard of living of the Québécois. 
One observer notes: "It was economics that won the election 
for the Liberals, but economics may yet be the reason why 
7 0 
Quebecers opt for independence." 
The Separatist Movement 
One of the main problems which has plagued the separa­
tist movement in Quebec was the splintered leadership. The 
separatist movement consisted of a number of highly diverse 
groups advocating independence. In 1957, Raymond Barbeau 
formed the Alliance Laurentienne, a rightist group with cleri­
cal and corporatist tendencies, which had few members. Dur­
ing September of 1960, a leftist group, the Action pour I'in-
dependence du Quebec (ASIQ) and the RIN were established. 
Marcel Chaput was vice-president of the RIN and ran for the 
Quebec Legislative Assembly, but the RIN, a pressure group 
rather than a political party, refused to get directly in­
volved in Chaput's campaign. Chaput was defeated and, angry 
with the RIN, formed the Parti republican du Quebec (PRQ), 
the first separatist political party. Raymond Barbeau, his 
Alliance Laurentienne faltering in 1962, requested that his 
members join the PRQ, but the PRQ itself only enjoyed a short 
existence because of financial difficulties. 
The fragmentation of groups devoted to separatism 
W. Hagy, "le Parti québécois in the 1970 Elec­
tions," Queens Quarterly, vol. 77 (1970), p. 273. 
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continued. In 1963, the Front de la liberation québécois 
burst onto the scene. Composed of a small group of middle-
class youths, they sought to achieve the independence of 
Quebec through terrorism. Most of its members were arrested. 
The Armee revolution québécois sought to replace the FLQ but 
never was very active. Other minor separatist groups of the 
1960s included the Parti socialiste du Quebec (PSQ) which 
split as soon as it was formed into three groups; the Parti 
Pris, a radical party which appealed mainly to intellectuals; 
the Phalange, an extreme right-wing group founded by Leo 
Trembly; and the Chevaliers de 1'independence, organized by 
a professional boxer named Reggie Chartrand. Also, a splinter 
group of the RIN formed the Regroupment national, lead by René 
Jutras, a physician who felt that the RIN was being won over 
to Communism. Jutras emphasized the old Quebec values of the 
Catholic Church and the family. 
In the 1966 elections there were three separatist 
parties: the RIN, the Parti socialiste du Quebec, and the RN. 
The RN had resulted from a merger of René Jutras Regroupement 
national and a group of dissident members of the provincial 
wing of the Creditiste Party - which had in turn split away 
from the national Social Credit Party. The Creditistes were 
led by Laurent Legault who acted as co-chairman of the RN 
along with Jutras. The RN was largely rural and conservative 
while the RIN, like the Liberal Party, was centered in Montreal 
and other urban districts. While the separatist parties 
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received 10 percent of the vote among themselves, they re­
ceived no seats, symbolic of the fact that the separatist 
movement was ineffective because of its lack of unity. The 
separatist movement in the early 1960s was lacking in unity 
of policies and leaders. Rene LeVesque united these diverse 
elements by 1968 under the Parti Québécois. 
Creation of the Parti Québécois 
It, was during the latter part of the 1960s that the 
Parti Québécois would find its roots. In 1964, a political 
observer of Quebec politics wrote that one essential ingredi^ 
ent which the separatist movement lacked was that of a 
charismatic leader. Rene LeVesque has filled this void. 
A popular news commentator, René LeVesque first entered poli­
tics in 1960 when he ran for the Quebec provincial legislature 
as a candidate of the Liberal Party, Levesque won the elec­
tion and was named Minister of Public Works and Hydraulic 
Resources. It was in this post that Levesque proved to be 
a major force behind Quebec's nationalization of its electric 
companies. 
LeVesque openly called for the separation of Quebec 
from the Canadian federation in 1967. According to his plan 
Quebec and the remainder of Canada would split and then Re­
unite in a common market, thus English and French Canadians 
^^William E. Griffith, "Quebec in Revolt," Foreign 
Affairs, October 1964, p. 35. 
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would each be governed as they wish while preserving the 
prosperity of each within North America. 
Levesque believed that the separatist movement in 
Quebec resulted from cultural considerations and that the 
French Canadian would only survive if Quebec had complete 
sovereignty. The Liberal Party, however, would not accept 
Levesque's thesis and therefore he resigned on October 14, 
1967. One month later, along with Gerard Belanger, Levesque 
formed a separatist pressure group called the Movement 
souverainete - association (MSA). 
In April of 1968, the MSA held a convention in which 
one thousand of its 7,500 members attended. During the 
course of the convention 1,145 new members joined. It de­
cided that its political plan for separation would focus on 
the establishment of an independent Quebec through friendly 
negotiations with Ottawa. It pointed to the precedents of 
the separation of Norway from Sweden, Hungary from Austria, 
Pakistan from India, and Ireland from Great Britain. Accord­
ing to its plan, the state would have control of all the 
means of education, communications, and information. French 
would be the only official language and the language of work 
in Quebec. The economic plan looked forward to a state in 
which the government was seen as the prime mover of the 
economy. Private industry would be allowed to continue but 
would be strongly regulated. 
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By May of 1968, the MSA claimed to have 10,073 dues-
paying members. In order to consolidate the power of the 
separatist movement the MSA negotiated with the other main 
separatist groups: the RN and RIN. 
The RIN, with 13,000 members, disagreed with the MSA 
on a major point; the status of English-speaking Quebecers. 
The RIN believed that Quebec should be unilingual and that 
there should be no governmental support given to English 
schools. Rene' LeVesque and the MSA, on the other hand, 
thought English schools should continue to receive aid. 
These negotiations were abruptly broken off June 24, 1968. 
Pierre Bourgault, leader of the RIN, had called for a demon­
stration against Prime Minister Trudeau. The demonstration 
got out of hand and ended in a bloody five-hour riot. There­
fore the MSA broke off the negotiations. 
In August of that same year negotiations resumed be­
tween the MSA, the RIN, and also the RN. The RIN still de­
manded the establishment of an unilingual Quebec and thus 
withdrew from the negotiations over this issue. The 
Ralliement national was a rural-based group described as a 
populist movement. Their leader, Gilles Gregoire, claimed 
to have 23,000 members but only 4,665 members could be found 
at the time of the convention. The MSA, however, had grown 
to 15,546 members. 
On October 14, 1968, the convention ended with the 
formation of a new party, the Parti Québécois. The only 
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major change made was that the Bank of Quebec would super­
vise banking and credit instead of the Bank of Canada in 
cooperation with Canada in order to satisfy former members 
of the RN. Rene Levesque was elected president with Gilles 
Gregorie as vice-president. Within a week the leaders of 
the RIN suggested that it should dissolve itself and join 
the PQ as individuals, which it did. 
The PQ seems to have provided the separatist move­
ment with an effective political party organization. Some 
observers believe, however, that if the citizens of Quebec 
would reject a referendum on separation, the Parti Québécois 
would disassemble. One author states: "One may suspect that 
the PQ, perceived as a gathering of people sharing a specific 
political goal without necessarily agreeing on basic ideolical 
points, will have problems of survival if ever the indepen-
7 2 dence option meets with failure." Thus, some observers 
feel that the political realignment in Quebec is not over. 
1970 Election 
"In 1970, Quebec's traditional two-party system was 
superseded by a multi-party system as two parties obtained 
7 3 
significant proportions of the popular vote," writes one 
political observer. Those two parties were the Parti 
^^Raymond Hudon, "The 1976 Quebec Election," Queen's 
Quarterly, Spring 1977, p. 29. 
^^vincent Lemieux, "The Provincial Party System in 
Quebec," in Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the In­
side , ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1973), p. 119. 
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Québécois and the Ralliement Creditiste. (See Table 2). Only 
six years later the Parti Québécois would capture enough sup­
port to gain control of Quebec's provincial government. 
The Union Nationale, under the leadership of Jean-
Jacques Bertrand, had controlled Quebec since 1966 when it 
had defeated the Liberal government of Jean Lesage. During 
that election, separatist parties had managed to gather 9 per­
cent of the vote. 
Premier Bertrand set the tone of the 1970 election 
when he announced that the election would be considered 
"partly as a referendum" on Quebec's role in the Canadian 
federation. On this issue, the Parti Québécois believed 
Quebec should separate, the Union Nationale said perhaps but 
not yet, and the Liberal Party thought that Quebec should 
remain in the federation, since it felt independence would 
mean economic disaster. 
The PQ's popular support in the 1970 election rose 
to 23 percent from 6 percent in the 1966 elections, quite a 
sizable gain. Some observers, however, question the validity 
of these results in relation to gauging the true strength of 
support for the PQ's call for independence. According to one 
author: "Strangely enough, many of those who stated that they 
planned to vote for the PQ did not approve of separation: 15.4 
percent agreed with separation, 46.2 percent more or less 
agreed, 30.8 percent disagreed and 7.7 percent gave no reply 
^^Hagy, op. cit., p. 267. 
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TABLE 2 
THE RESULTS OF THE 1966 AND 1970 PROVINCIAL 
ELECTIONS IN QUEBEC 
1966 1970 
Liberal Party 47 45 
Union Nationale 41 20 
R.I.N.('66)-Parti Québécois('70) 6 23 
R.N,('66)-Ralliement Creditiste('70) 3 11 
Others 3 1 
NUMBER OF SEATS 
Liberal Party 50 72 
Union Nationale 56 17 
R.I.N.('66)-Parti Québécois('70) 7 
R.N.('66)-Ralliement Creditiste ('70) • 12 
Others 2 
Source: "The Ongoing Political Realignments in Quebec," in 
Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside, 
ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1973), p. 120. 
67 
7 5 
in a survey conducted by the Montreal Star." 
Although the PQ gained 2 3  percent of the popular vote, 
it only received seven seats in the National Assembly while 
the Union Nationale, which received 20 percent of the popular 
vote, gained 16 seats. Why this lack of seats for the PQ? 
As a result of Section 80 of the B.N.A. Act, many English-
speaking counties in Quebec are protected. In other words, 
smaller rural districts have more electing power than larger 
urban districts. As a result, while the Liberal party won 
67 percent of the seats, it only received 45 percent of the 
popular vote. 
Although the Liberals won the election, they were 
placed in a position of having to live up to their promises 
or face defeat. According to one author: 
The separatists in 1966 had elected no members. In 
1970 the Parti Québécois sent seven deputies to the 
National Assembly. With their popular vote, the 
separatists were the second in 36 other counties, 
although in 13 of these they were a weak alterna­
tive. Had the near-victories in the other 23 
counties been victories, the PQ would have elected 
30 members. In each of these ridings, they lost 
to Liberals and thus -the Liberal representation 
would have been reduced to 49. In every case 
where the PQ placed second, except Rouyn-Noranda, 
they lost to Liberals. Therefore if the Liberals 
do not live up to their promises, the PQ will be 
quite likely to capitalize on their mistakes.76 
^^Ibid. , p. 270 . 
T^Ibid., p. 272 . 
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1976 Election 
The elections of 1976 were to prove quite different 
from those of 1970. What accounted for this change? 
First, there was a lack of support for Liberals as 
shown by polls taken prior to the election. An April poll 
by the Centre de recherches sur l'opinion publique (CROP) 
showed the PQ with 41 percent of the popular support, leading 
the Liberals with 28 percent. The Liberals immediately re­
plied by publishing the results of another survey, conducted 
by the Institut québécois de l'opinion publique (IQOP), 
showing that the PQ was trailing the Liberals 43 to 38 percent. 
To clarify this discrepancy. La Presse ordered a Gallup Poll 
in May, which confirmed the-large lead of the PQ (44 percent 
to 33 percent). 
The Liberal party itself was responsible for the rise 
of discontent. Many of its members, at one level or another, 
were found to be implicated in scandals and corrupt activities. 
Second, the economic situation was worsening. The rate 
of unemployment rose to its highest level since World War Two. 
One political analyst states: "This factor worked against the 
Liberal government especially as it claimed to be the best one, 
under Bourassa's leadership, to cope with Quebec's economic 
7 7 difficulties." Charges of poor management were leveled against 
the Liberal administration in the handling of the Olympic 
7 7 
Hudon, op. cit.; p. 20. 
69 
installations and of the James Bay hydroelectric development. 
Third was the prominence of social tensions within 
Quebec. The controversial language act, Bill 22, left Eng­
lish Quebecers with the feeling of betrayal. It declared 
French the official language of Quebec, but at many points 
indicated where English could be used, at the discretion of 
some authority or other. It is the vagueness of these discre­
tionary powers that upset many in minority groups. The bill 
established French to be the language of instruction, but 
school boards can provide instruction in English with the 
approval of the Education Minister. However, for a pupil 
to be enrolled in an English language class, he must have 
"sufficient knowledge" of that language first--otherwise 
the student starts out in French. 
The recent dispute between the federal government 
and air traffic controllers and pilots posed once again the 
question of the status of the French language in Canada. 
The federal government's reductions by 20 percent of the 
production quotas of milk producers also produced discontent 
in Quebec's rural areas. 
It has been suggested that. 
In fact, there were in Quebec 'two different elec­
toral campaigns' in October and November 1976. The 
outcome shows that the PQ benefited most from the 
political situation just described. However, at 
the level of the electorate, the reaction was ex­
pressed in two different ways. While Bill 22 and 
the necessity of stopping the PQ represented the 
most important issue for the Anglophones, the 
Francophones were more concerned about the bad 
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economic situation and the weakness of Bourassa's 
leadership. This was apparent in the electoral 
choices: the PQ became the major party for the 
Francophones while Anglophones continued to 
elect mainly Liberals, while switching for a 
significant part to the Union Nationale rU.N.), 
thereby electing a few U.N. c a n d i d a t e s .78 
One magazine reported: "The major reason behind the PQ triumph 
was the six and one half years often inept and inefficient 
7 9 
Liberal Party rule." Comments such as this reveal a shadow 
of doubt in the minds of writers on the true support for inde­
pendence advocated by the Parti Québécois. However, before 
drawing any conclusions on the likelihood of the PQ's success, 
a look at its party programs will be helpful in this analysis. 
The assumption is made here that the probability of the PQ's 
success will depend on how well the PQ can present its case to 
the citizens of Quebec, which is the purpose of their party 
program. 
78 
°Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
7 Q 
K. M. Chrysler, "Tragedy of the Two Canadas," U.S. 
News and World Report, December 13, 1978, p. 48. 
CHAPTER IV 
PROGRAM OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS 
Four centuries of common history have formed French 
Quebecers into a nation, which has always contained 
in its bosom a large minority of people from a vari­
ety of backgrounds, whose basic rights it has re­
spected more than most other nations. This founding 
people has always manifested the desire to develop 
its own, distinctive culture. But it has become ob­
vious, with time, that this objective can only be 
achieved if it has full control over the reins of 
its political l i f e . 8 0  
This passage introduces the official program of the 
Parti Québécois, adopted at the 6th National Convention held 
in Montreal May 27-29, 1977. Today, in the Federal Parlia­
ment, Quebec has only 74 out of a total of 264 members and at 
most federal-provincial conferences, Quebec finds itself at 
odds with the other ten governments. It is precisely this 
situation which the Parti Québécois seeks to change. The PQ, 
tired of French Canadians occupying a minority position vis-a­
vis the English-speaking Canadians, has called for the politi­
cal independence of Quebec. In its view, federalism has only 
proven to work against Quebec's best interests. 
Political Separation 
The first plank of the Parti Québécois program calls 
SOofficial Program of the Parti Québécois, 1978 Edi­
tion, May 27-29, 1977, p. 7. 
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for political sovereignty for Quebec to be achieved through 
democratic means; i.e., a referendum. The Parti Québécois 
bases its belief of the right of Quebec to self-determination 
on Canada's membership in the United Nations and commitment 
to the U.N. Charter, which recognizes the right of all peoples 
to self-determination. 
Achieving Independence 
The Parti Québécois has always maintained that it in­
tends to achieve independence through democratic means while 
respecting the rights of its neighbors. The PQ has promised 
to hold a referendum concerning independence sometime during 
its first term in office, when it judges it most opportune. 
If Quebec citizens support political independence, based upon 
a referendum to that effect, the PQ would propose to the 
National Assembly a law authorizing it to request from Ottawa 
the repatriation of all powers, except those which both gov­
ernments will jointly agree to entrust to a joint commission 
for the purpose of economic association. The PQ would enter 
into technical discussions with Ottawa on the orderly trans­
fer of powers. If Ottawa should refuse to enter into such 
negotiations, Quebec would, "Systematically exercise all of 
the powers of a sovereign state in the event that it should 
81 have to act unilaterally," according to the PQ program. 
^^Official Program of the Parti Québécois, 1978 Edi­
tion., p. 7. 
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During the remainder of the present political regime, 
the PQ would promote Quebec's independence as much as possible. 
This would include obtaining recognition for Quebec by other 
states and requesting admission to the United Nations. The PQ 
would submit to the Quebec people a national constitution 
drawn up by citizens at the county level and adopted by their 
representatives at a constituent assembly. 
Economic Union 
/ 
The Parti Québécois has called for an economic asso­
ciation between Quebec and the remainder of Canada in order 
to assure the financial security for both parties. Rene 
Levesque writes: . . there is no reason why we, as future 
neighbors, should not conform to the second great trend of 
our times; the new economic groups, customs unions, common 
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markets, etc.'' The proposed economic association would 
include the coordination of fiscal policies between an inde­
pendent Quebec and the remainder of Canada. 
The PQ prefers this arrangement because of the high 
degree of economic integration which presently exists be­
tween Quebec and Canada. It also believes that such an 
association would not compromise Quebec's political indepen­
dence since both governments would be dealing from positions 
of sovereignty instead of the current majority-minority status 
of English and French-speaking Canadians. 
Although the PQ believes an economic association would 
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make things easier for both Quebec and the remainder of 
Canada, it does not think it is absolutely necessary for 
the survival of an independent Quebec. This position is 
not surprising since the PQ would not want to base the 
feasibility of its survival as a free country on the con­
sent of Canada to an economic union. 
According to its program, the PQ would: 
1. Recognize to what extent Quebec's economy is 
integrated with Canada's (and, especially, 
with Ontario's) and the mutual benefits to be 
gained by maintaining the free circulation of 
goods between these two markets. This would 
entail a renunciation, by both sides, of the 
idea of creating tariff barriers between the 
two trading partners, and the establishment 
of a special system for agicultuural products. 
2. Discuss and conclude a customs union treaty 
formalizing this reciprocal agreement, if 
such is the desire of the parties involved, 
and harmonize and co-ordinate Quebec's insti­
tutions and economic policies with those of 
both but, at the same time, protect Quebec's 
interests.83 
Rene Levesque writes: "Such an association seems to us, in 
fact, made to measure for the purpose of allowing us, unfettered 
by obsolete constitutional forms, to pool our stakes with what­
ever permanent consultation and flexible adjustments would 
8 4 
serve our common economic interests. . . ." 
^^Rene Levesque, An Option for Quebec (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 28. 
8 3 y / 
Official Program of the Parti Québécois, op. cit., 
p. 25. 
^"^Levesque, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Economic Policy 
According to the PQ, Quebec's economy is on the de­
cline because of the domination of foreign companies. It 
believes that for all intents and purposes, there are virtually 
no francophones in the key decision-making positions, thus 
Quebecers have little to say in how their economy is run. For 
the most part, French-speaking Canadians occupy only salaried 
and lower levels of the work scale in Quebec. Therefore, the 
PQ would repatriate the main decision-making centers, primarily 
with the help of public and cooperative enterprise. Public 
authorities would be given additional resources, such as ex­
tensive financial backing, a means of economic intervention, 
an economic development plan, and controls on foreign invest­
ment and the financial system. 
Quebec's economic policy would be based on human and 
social considerations by establishing an economic system that 
eliminates all forms of worker exploitation and meets the 
real needs of all the Quebec citizens rather than the de­
mands of a privileged economic minority. The PQ would see 
that the economy is run more democratically by encouraging 
collective forms of organization and guaranteeing worker par­
ticipation in the decision-making process. All citizens 
would be ensured a minimum income, and health, housing, edu­
cation, work, and justice would be considered as basic rights 
to all. Social progress would be considered more important 
than economic progress. 
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According to the PQ, Quebecers are the most heavily-
taxed people in all of Canada, mainly because of the costly 
duplication of the many services inherent to the federal 
system. Rene Levesque writes: 
The two levels of government, which each collect 
about the same amount of taxes, operate in more 
or less the same areas - mainly because the fed­
eral government is constantly trying to butt into 
Quebec's jurisdictional area, but also because 
Quebec finds it necessary to duplicate federal 
services in order to promote the interests of 
Quebecers which otherwise would be abandoned or 
looked down on by Ottawa.85 
The duplication of the tax system also creates further compli­
cations. Since taxpayers are no longer able to judge the equity 
of the system, they no longer know if the services they are 
receiving correspond to their share of the tax burden. 
This theme of waste as a result of duplication inherent 
in federal systems runs throughout the program of the Parti 
Québécois. More importantly, the PQ thinks the services which 
the federal government does provide to Quebec are not in Que­
bec's interest. Therefore, the PQ wants to repatriate all tax 
revenues presently collected from Quebecers by Ottawa and 
provide Quebec citizens with all the services currently sup­
plied by Ottawa. By this method, Quebecers would be assured 
of their taxes being allocated according to their best inter­
ests. 
p. 17. 
^^Official Program of the Parti Québécois, op. cit.. 
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Bus iness 
The Parti Québécois thinks that it must occupy a 
greater role in regulating the Quebec economy. One measure 
which is of great concern to outside investors, and thus is 
very important for future economic investment, and the eco­
nomic viability of an independent Quebec, is the creation of 
an investment code to govern companies whose shares are held 
by nonresidents. Within the limits of the code, the PQ would 
encourage foreign investment in the Quebec economy by develop­
ing as many sources of foreign capital as possible by dis­
tinguishing three categories of investment in keeping with 
the economic sectors that are affected. 
The first category would exclude any foreign partici­
pation in what are considered vital sectors; for example, 
cultural affairs, radio and television, publishing, or in the 
industrial sectors in which company activities should be re­
stricted in keeping with the public interest--for example, 
iron ore mining. 
The second category would allow foreign participation 
on a minority scale (less than 49 percent), although this 
percentage could vary according to the area when the produc­
tion, the technical staff available, and the expertise re­
quired permit the creation of groups of whom a majority are 
Quebecers. 
The third division would allow foreign participation 
on a majority scale (up to 99 percent) in sectors that have 
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no real influence on the direction of the economy: sectors 
that are largely dependent on external markets for selling 
their products and in which Quebec does not occupy a com­
petitive position, and sectors in which technology is used 
that Quebec does not have. Dividends paid by companies con­
trolled mainly by foreign interests would not be allowed to 
amount to more than half of the profits after taxes earned 
in Quebec. The majority of workers of such companies would 
also be required to be Quebecers. Such companies would be 
granted a reasonable delay in order to conform to these 
regulations. 
Any transaction that would place a company in the 
hands of foreign interests would have to secure permission 
from the Council of Ministers. The Society of Industrial 
Reorganization would take over any profit-making company 
that would close or move out of Quebec, If the workers 
thought such a move to be advisable, they could buy back 
the company. Any intervention by the Society for Industrial 
Reorganization would aim at putting an end to what the PQ 
calls emotional blackmail too often used against workers of 
governments. 
The Parti Québécois acknowledges that Quebec has 
serious economic problems. It holds these, however, to be 
a result of the state's inability to create a coherent de­
velopment program because of the inefficiency caused by the 
division of state powers between two levels of government. 
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According to the PQ, Ottawa and Quebec often pursue differ­
ent objectives or cancel each other's efforts by lapsing 
into insoluble jurisdictional disputes. In order to solve 
these problems, Quebec must decide for itself what courses 
of action to follow to ensure its best interests. 
Cultural Policy 
The issue of cultural maintenance is one of the main 
concerns of the Parti Québécois. According to the PQ's pro­
gram: "Education and culture, the tools of man's liberation, 
are a basic prerequisite for human government - an important 
factor in any society's social and economic development."^^ 
Some measures which have already been taken by the PQ pro­
vincial government have caused great controversy; for 
example, its language Bill 101. 
Language 
According to the Parti Québécois: 
In most countries, companies operate in the language 
of the majority and immigrants naturally become in­
tegrated with the linguistic group of the majority -
which occupies most of the important positions in 
the society. In comparison to these countries, 
Quebec looks more like a colony: francophones who 
have the same amount of education as anglophones 
clearly occupy more than their fair share of low-
income jobs; conversely, anglophones have more than 
the lion's share of important positions, and have 
traditionally demonstrated a presence dispropor­
tionate to their numbers in advertising, newspapers. 
Ibid., p. 18. 
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radio, and television - thus contributing to the 
anglicization of Quebecers. In nine cases out of 
ten, immigrants have integrated into the English-
speaking group.87 
Members of the Parti Québécois fear that if such a process 
continues, francophones will become a minority in Montreal 
within a generation. 
Therefore, the PQ has called for measures that will 
ensure the superiority of the French language. One measure 
would make French the only official language of Quebec. At 
the end of a five-year transition period, French would be 
the only language of the State, its public bodies, and insti­
tutions . 
Other measures include the requirement that all con­
tracts between individuals, as well as companies, be drawn 
up in French unless all parties involved express the desire 
to use another language, and the use of French in all de­
liberative assemblies and minutes of meetings, except for 
ethnic groups of a cultural nature. Company names in Quebec 
would have to be French, along with public and private signs. 
Efforts would be made to ensure that streets and squares are 
given French names with the exception of a few cases of 
historic significance, and that all labels, directions, and 
printed or engraved signs be made French. French would also 
be the language of internal communications, negotiations, and 
collective agreements in all companies operating in Quebec. 
G^lbid., p. 41. 
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Under the threat of heavy sanctions and the obligation 
to compensate for any harm caused, employers would be pro­
hibited from refusing, without cause, to hire employees who 
only spoke French, or to dismiss employees because they only 
know French. The use of a foreign language would be re­
stricted to specific needs; for example, tourism, foreign trade, 
and employers would be required to provide proof of the need to 
use a foreign language. All Quebecers would be guaranteed the 
right to be served in French. Persons providing goods and ser­
vices would first be required to address clients in French. 
The anglophone minority would be provided with English 
language education at all levels subject to the following pro­
visions: The Ministry of Education could grant English-
language institutions to the anglophone minority, provided 
that teaching in such institutions was carried out partly in 
French and that all pupils or students demonstrated a suitable 
knowledge of the French language and Quebec culture in relation 
to their intellectual development. Access to English-language 
institutions would be restricted to children attending such 
institutions at the time the language law went into effect, 
their brothers and sisters, the descendants of citizens who 
had conducted their elementary school studies in English in 
Quebec, or were doing so at the present time. 
All new immigrants,, regardless of their mother tongue, 
would attend French schools and foreigners who came to Quebec 
to study would only be admitted to English-language institutions 
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if they were prepared to assume all of the teaching and ad­
ministrative costs. 
Through such measures as these proposals ensuring 
the supremacy of the French language, the PQ hopes to stem 
the tide of language assimilation and to establish French as 
the working language of Quebec. 
The Political System 
President 
The Parti Québécois would establish a republican gov­
ernment with a presidential system. The president would act 
as both chief of state and as head of the government. Election 
would be by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term and 
the president's mandate could only be renewed once. In case of 
death, incapacity, or resignation, he would be replaced by a 
vice-president who would be elected at the same time as the 
près ident. 
Presidential powers would include: naming the ministers 
and secretaries of State, who could not also be members of 
Parliament at the same time, suggesting to the National Assembly 
nominations for Supreme Court Justices, and the power of veto. 
The veto power, however, could be rendered null and void if the 
laws were adopted on second reading in the National Assembly by 
a two-thirds majority vote. The president would also have the 
right of reprieve. 
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National Assembly 
The National Assembly, also to be elected by direct 
universal suffrage, would vote the budget and all credits, 
exercise control over the executive, convene and question 
ministers and secretaries of State, establish a system of 
permanent, specialized parliamentary commissions, and vote 
on all bills, including bills coming from the executive. 
The National Assembly would have the power to override the 
president's veto by a two-thirds majority vote. It would also 
have the power to revoke (impeach) the president, requiring a 
three-quarters majority vote. 
The PQ also pledges to pass a general law on référen­
dums which would ensure that the options offered would be 
clear and unequivocal, and would be formulated in such a way 
as to allow for a true choice. 
Citizenship 
When Quebec declares independence, says the PQ, it 
will recognize as Quebecers all Canadian citizens residing 
in Quebec, including new Canadians. Landed immigrants would 
follow the normal procedures for obtaining citizenship, under 
the Quebec regime, and any rights they had acquired would be 
respected in keeping with the immigration laws in effect when 
Quebec attained sovereignty. 
Public Administration 
With the attainment of independence, the government of 
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Quebec would have to deal with new responsibilities which, up 
until this time, have been handled by the federal government. 
One such area is that of an efficient public administration. 
One criticism of the political independence option for Quebec 
has been that if Quebec were to leave the Canadian federation, 
many of the English Canadians now occupying top positions in 
Quebec's managerial and administrative levels would leave, 
thus leaving Quebec in a difficult position. In order to 
ensure an amount of continuity, at least in governmental ad­
ministrative positions, the PQ says it will integrate federal 
employees and civil servants residing in Quebec, who so desire, 
into Quebec's civil service without any loss of financial 
benfits; their salary range would remain unchanged and any 
pension and retirement funds, as well as the contributions 
paid by the employer would be transferred to Quebec through 
negotiations with the Canadian government. All fringe bene­
fits acquired would be retained and, if necessary, an in­
demnity would be paid to cover moving expenses. Thus the 
PQ hopes to persuade some of the present federal civil ser­
vice employees to continue their work for an independent state 
of Quebec. 
Foreign Policy 
An independent Quebec would have no intention of shut­
ting itself off from the world and retreating to within its 
borders; rather, it would participate fully in international 
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life. According to the PQ program, Quebec's foreign policy 
would rest on these basic principles: safeguarding the in­
terests of the Quebec people, peace, collective security, 
the necessary interdependence of peoples, recognizing the 
value of the economic and sociocultural contributions of 
other states, and the solidarity of the Quebec people with 
the developing nations. 
Therefore, the PQ pledges to promote the freedom of 
nations and respect for their national character (which is 
what the PQ is demanding for Quebec) as well as interna­
tional cooperation. It would also reject all forms of neo­
colonialism by keeping an eye on investments and the conduct 
of Quebec business abroad. The PQ would refuse to support 
regimes that do not respect the United Nations Charter on 
Human Rights and respect the principle of noninterference 
in the domestic affairs of another state. 
A free Quebec would seek to establish friendly rela­
tions with the international community and consider as 
priorities the replacement of preferential ties with the 
Commonwealth by close relations with francophone countries, 
the establishment of close relations with the Third World 
countries, especially with Latin America, and the maintenance 
of close ties with Canada and the United States. 
The PQ would practice a peaceful foreign policy based 
on rejection of the use of war to solve international disputes. 
Therefore an independent Quebec would advocate disarmament, the 
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banning of nuclear tests, the use of nuclear arms and germ 
warfare, and the réévaluation of military alliances in light 
of these principles. Military spending would be substantially 
reduced, replacing traditional armed forces with territorial 
defense units which could also be used for non-military pur­
poses such as fire-fighting, and could collaborate with the 
United Nations in a peace^keeping capacity. 
Finally, the PQ would create a research and surveil­
lance unit, which would be under the control of the National 
Assembly, whose purpose would be to prevent political inter­
ference of multinational companies in the State of Quebec. 
Thus the PQ wants to ensure that Quebecers will have full con­
trol over their affairs. 
International Consequences 
An independent Quebec would entail serious interna­
tional consequences and therefore the PQ had assured its 
neighbors, especially the United States, that it would not 
threaten their security. According to its program, the PQ 
says it will respect those treaties binding Quebec and Canada 
which are favorable to Quebec and revoke others in accordance 
with the rules of international law. 
Territorially, Quebec would claim all of its territory 
including Labrador and the islands off the New Quebec coast, 
the continental shelf, the 200-mile coastal limit, the so-
called "federal" parks and the Quebec part of the area around 
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the national capital. It would also reclaim as Quebec terri­
tory the Artie islands and territories that presently belong 
to Canada by virtue of the same title as other Nordic coun­
tries. If no agreement can be reached on these questions, 
the PQ says it will occupy these areas through legal means 
(granting concessions, setting up institutions, etc.) and 
then taking the case to the International Court of Justice. 
Critique of PQ Program 
The Parti Québécois has been criticized by anti-
separatists both within and outside Quebec for advocating 
political independence while not having detailed the means 
by which Quebec would survive if it were independent. In 
answer to such criticism one PQ member responds: "In the 
beginning, we must be content to establish a solid general 
outline for the required structure, without losing ourselves 
in the details of short-term or piecemeal economics, the 
factor always picked-on by the timid when they want to 
frighten themselves, and.by the 'others' when they want to 
frighten us."^^ Rene Levesque agrees, claiming that these 
objections are raised in an attempt to confuse the issue of 
independence, calling them scare tactics while acknowledging 
that the "take-off" (independence) is a gamble. 
However, predictions of economic doom, should Quebec 
SSBernard Chenot, "A New Canadian Union," in An Op -
tion for Quebec, Rene Levesque (Toronto; McClelland and 
Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 32. 
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leave the Canadian federation, still cast a shadow of gloom 
over the option of political independence. One observer 
states; "The separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada 
would leave the Québécois in misery, poverty, and unemploy­
ment."^® He points out that approximately 35 percent of the 
burden paid to the provinces of Canada are given to Quebec 
while Quebecers contribute only 25 percent of these payments. 
Thus he concludes that the economic cost of separation for 
Quebec would be prohibitive. 
The PQ says it will seek the establishment of an eco­
nomic union with the remainder of Canada. But would the rest 
of Canada agree to such an arrangement? Some observers, mainly 
English-speaking, do not think so, because of the ill feelings 
which are sure to accompany a breakup of the Canadian federa­
tion. Others point out that neither Quebec nor the rest of 
Canada would give the other party veto power on tariff poli­
cies and trading arrangements with other foreign nations.®^ 
According to the PQ, neither side would like to see 
the loss of the other's market. Quebec would not want to lose 
the large Canadian market nor would Canada want to lose its 
access to the Quebec market. Quebec purchases two dollars of 
goods from English Canada for every one dollar of goods that 
^^Jean Provencher, Rene LeVesque, Portrait d'un 
québécois (Ottawa: Les Editions La Presse, 1973), p. 241. 
^'^Bruce Hutchison, "Canada's Troubles," Foreign 
Affairs, October 1977, p. 180. 
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Quebec sells to English Canada. Therefore, the Parti 
Québécois foresees little difficulty in obtaining Canada's 
acceptance for the proposed economic association once po­
litical separation becomes a fact. One observer writes: 
"Indeed, the probability of that event [political separa­
tion] may depend to an important degree on the likelihood 
that a Quebec-Canada customs union can be established, or 
at least to the degree that the Parti Québécois can convince 
the Quebec electorate that it can be established."^^ 
Referendum 
When the PQ first came to power, it promised to hold 
a referendum on political independence within two years, but 
it has postponed the date to a time closer to the end of its 
five-year mandate. Asked to comment on Levesque's decision, 
Prime Minister Trudeau replied: "I suppose he is beginning 
to realize that it is going to be a tougher and longer pro­
cess than he had bargained for to convince Quebecers to vote 
for independence, and I suppose that confirms my view that 
Quebecers will not be easily moved, to vote for indepen-
q 2 
dence. . . ." 
Mr. LeVesque has said that he foresees a long pre-
referendum campaign, which in fact has already started. 
M. Treddenick, "Quebec and Canada: Some Economic 
Aspects of Independence," Journal of Canadian Studies, 
December 1973, p. 16. 
^^Canada Weekly, February 9, 1977, p. 8. 
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When asked why the PQ is going to wait, he replied: 
To give you a simple part of the answer, we have 
not yet devised the rules for holding a referen­
dum on a Quebec-wide level. We're working right 
now on basic referendum legislation. 
Even more important, perhaps, we have not 
yet had a chance to spell out the economic and 
other aspects of the Quebec situation. That takes 
some time. We've just started to tell our side of 
the story.93 
The proposed referendum has been the subject of great 
concern. Some observers claim that the Liberal government was 
responsible for its own defeat in 1976 because of its misman­
agement of affairs. Because of the PQ's promise to hold a 
referendum on the question of separation, many non-separatists 
were enabled to vote for the Parti Québécois to register their 
protest against a corrupt Liberal government, while still per­
mitting these same voters to veto the option of political in­
dependence when such a referendum would be held. Therefore, 
some political observers believe that the proposed referendum 
allowed the PQ to capture support in its election victory in 
1976 that it would otherwise have not received, but that this 
element will not necessarily support the PQ's quest for inde­
pendence. 
The wording of the referendum itself has become a 
source of contention. Those opposed to Quebec independence 
fear that the referendum will be worded in such a way that it 
will be misleading, that it will not offer a clear-cut choice. 
^^Quebec en Bref, "Monsieur Levesque desire une vraie 
Confederation," December 1977, p. 2. 
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and thus will not reflect the true support for separatism 
among Quebecers. There has been discussion of the federal 
government holding its own national referendum on the ques­
tion of national unity. This would allow the federal govern­
ment to decide on the wording of the referendum and possibly 
rob the separatist movement of its momentum if such a refer­
endum were to result in the rejection of the separatist op­
tion. 
Important for the Parti Québécois is the apparent 
acceptance by the federal government of recognizing the 
opinions of the Quebec citizenry. Prime Minister Trudeau 
has stated that if indeed the citizens of Quebec do vote in 
favor of separation by a significant amount, negotiations 
between the federal and Quebec governments will follow. Al­
though Prime Minister Trudeau does not believe in separation 
as an acceptable alternative, he does admit that "all is 
negotiable" as far as the Canadian constitution is concerned. 
These negotiations, according to Trudeau's plans, while not 
leading to political separation, would involve revamping the 
Canadian federation to ensure the cultural rights of the 
French Canadian. 
Levesque, on the other hand, unequivocally refuses to 
engage in negotiations concerning the current federal frame­
work of Canada because he no longer believes in the ability 
of the federation to protect Quebec's interests. LeVesque 
has said that perhaps he would enter into discussions that 
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seek a profound realignment leading to a new form of Canadian 
confederation, but it would be necessary that this structure 
be a true association of two sovereign states. 
Therefore, prospects for negotiations leading to the 
restructuring of the Cannadian federation if the separatist 
referendum were to succeed seem to be slim at the present 
time. 
Conclusion 
Running throughout the Parti Québécois program is the 
belief that Canada's federal system is obsolete. The PQ re­
peatedly states that the present federal system robs Quebec 
of the needed tools to handle its problems. Rather, feder­
alism results in the interference by the federal government 
into the affairs of Quebec, as demonstrated by endless 
jurisdictional battles and the duplication of services be­
tween the federal and Quebec governments. Many times these 
two levels of government pursue different objectives and 
therefore their activities sometimes cancel out each other's 
efforts. 
While the Parti Québécois does not claim that problems 
would be easily solved if Quebec were independent, it firmly 
believes that its problems cannot be solved by someone else; 
namely, the English-dominated federal government. The Parti 
Québécois contends that independence is a precondition to a 
solution to Quebec's problems in such a way as to serve the 
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best interests of French Canadians. This is the main point 
of the PQ program: French Canadians must have complete con­
trol of their destiny; i.e., they must control all decisions 
made affecting them, if they are to survive and develop ac­
cording to their French culture. According to the PQ, only 
through political independence can French Canadians secure 
their continued existence. Will the people of Quebec be con­
vinced by the PQ's argument for independence? 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The Parti Québécois is seeking to preserve the French 
culture of Quebec citizens, a goal of Quebecers ever since 
their conquest by the English. At first, la survivance was 
based upon a policy of isolation within Quebec. Quebecers 
only became involved in national politics when they felt their 
rights were threatened, French Canadians learned to take ad­
vantage of rights granted them by the British Parliament. The 
Quebec Act of 1774, which placed French Canadians on an equal 
political and religious status with English Canadians, and 
the Constitutional Act of 1791 which provided French Canadians 
with a geographical as well as a political base, are illus­
trative of this point. Although the British government tried 
to foster assimilation, Quebecers succeeded in maintaining 
their unique way of life. 
The establishment of the Canadian federation of 1867 
did not change the situation. Although English and French 
Canadians joined together, their motives differed. English 
Canadians sought a means to pursue economic expansion without 
interference from the French Canadians. French Canadians, on 
the other hand, wanted to preserve their identity and felt, 
94 
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in face of the overwhelming assimulative pressures which con­
fronted them from the United States's "melting pot", believed 
that membership in the Canadian federation would at least ensure 
Quebecers of language and cultural rights which they had already 
secured from the British government. 
This contrast of motivations for joining the federation 
by English and French Canadians has posed problems for the func­
tioning of the Canadian political system in the past and certainly 
provides an important component in explaining the current strength 
of the Quebec separatist movement lead by the Parti Québécois. 
In the past this "negative" attitude on the part of Quebec's French 
Canadians has prevented their active participation in national 
politics. Although English Canada has been at times frustrated by 
the lack of consensus between their positions and that of Quebec, 
for example, during the Conscription Crises of World War I and II, 
they were not challenged to the extent to which they are today. 
Presently, however, the supporters of the Parti Québécois 
are not challenging specific policies of the federal government, 
but are instead questioning the legitimacy of the Canadian federal 
system itself. French Canadians object to their position as a 
"permanent minority" within the federal system. According to one 
author, those advocating Quebec separatism see "...the problem of 
French Canada as that of a nation, with a common culture and 
language, but lacking the instruments of government necessary to 
promote its national aspirations."^^ Thus Quebec separatists seek 
^Vlex Macleod, "Nationalism and Social Class: The Unresolved 
Dilemma of the Quebec Left," Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 8. 
no. 3, December 1975» P« 15« 
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to ensure a "French" solution to their problems. No longer are 
they tolerant of the English-Canadian domination of their lives, 
which they feel threatens the continued existence of their 
unique way of life. In the past, French Canadians relied upon 
their Catholic Church as protector of their culture. Today, 
that reliance has shifted to Quebec's provincial government. 
For the Parti Québécois, the recuperation by the Quebec govern­
ment of the major instruments of political decision making is 
essential for the establishment of a society where all individ­
uals can achieve full self-determination. It seeks to escape 
the frustrating political majority/minority situation in which 
French Canadians find themselves. According to the PQ, Quebec 
is so different that its demands cannot be met within the 
present Canadian federation, but must be allowed to go completely 
its own way. 
Will the Parti Québécois succeed in attaining political 
independence for Quebec? Commenting on the possibility of an 
independent Quebec, Rene Lévesque writes: 
At first sight, this looks like a dramatically rapid 
development, this burgeoning and flowering over a 
very few years of a political emancipation movement 
in a population which, until recently, was commonly 
referred to as quiet old Quebec. But in fact, its 
success would mean, very simply, the normal healthy 
end result of a long and laborious national evolu-q q ® 
tion.^3 
Was the PQ's electoral victory a result of Quebec 
9 5 / / 
Rene Levesque, "For an Independent Quebec," Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 54, no. 4, July 1976, p. 735. 
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support for separation or was it of dissatisfaction with the 
previous Liberal government? Most observers, including Rene 
LeVesque, believe that the PQ election of 1976 was not a man­
date by Quebecers for separation. One writer notes: 
Levesque's party won power by soft-pedaling seces­
sion and promising good, honest government. Since 
then, polls show that only a minority of the Pro­
vince's population - 5 million French-speaking 
citizens and 1 million Anglophones - has been won 
over to the idea of independence. 
Even this minority is shrinking. A sampling 
in July showed 70 percent opposed to separation 
compared with the 62 percent against the idea 
last April 1977.96 
Rene Levesque promised, during the 1976 campaign, to 
hold a referendum on the question of independence. Because of 
this stipulation, some observers have stated that Quebecers 
voted for the PQ with the knowledge that they would have the 
opportunity to reject the option of political independence, 
while still supporting the Parti Québécois. Therefore not all 
PQ supporters were endorsing Quebec separatism in 1976. 
The PQ played down its separatist goals and .concen­
trated on provincial issues, attacking Liberal Premier Robert 
Bourassa's government for Quebec's 10.1 percent unemployment 
rate and alleged corruption in government. In fact, during 
the 1976 provincial campaign, only 7 percent of the Quebec 
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public regarded separation as the prime issue. One historian 
writes : 
^^"Independence for Quebec; The Debate gets Sharper," 
U.S. News and World Report, September 26, 1977, p. 43. 
G^Henry S. Albinski, "Currents in Canadian Politics," 
Current History, April 1977, p. 161. 
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Rene LeVesque, leader and founder of the PQ, knew 
that those who voted PQ were not necessarily sepa­
ratists; a poll taken just before the election re­
vealed that only 18 percent of the Quebec electorate 
were in favor of separation. LeVesque had not con­
centrated on the issue of separatism but had attacked 
the Liberal government for its inefficiencies, mis­
management, and disregard of the basic social issues 
in Quebec; unemployment (10 percent of Quebec's Labor 
force compared with an average of 2.6 percent for the 
rest of Canada), labor unrest, continual strikes, and 
the huge deficit of the provincial government. Thus, 
those who voted for responsible government with a 
concern for social and economic issues and not pri­
marily for separatism.98 
Then just how much support for political independence 
does the PQ actually have? According to one political scien­
tist: "Clearly, most of the independists are Parti Québécois 
supporters, but not all Parti Québécois supporters are inde­
pendists. . . . This situation adds to the difficulty of asses­
sing the strength and predicting the progress of the indepen-
99 
dist movement." Exemplary of the confusion over the support 
for independence is a poll taken just one week after the elec­
tion which showed that only 11 percent of Quebecers favored 
100 
separatism. 
Therefore the true strength of separatist support among 
Quebecers remains unclear. Federalists contend that the 
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Kenneth M. Glazier, "Separatism and Quebec," Current 
History, April 1977, p. 161. 
^^Daniel Latouche, "The Independence Option: Ideologi­
cal and Empirical Elements," quoted in Quebec Society and Poli­
tics: Views from the Inside, ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto : 
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973), p. 189. 
^^^Kenneth M. Glazier, op. cit., p. 154. 
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citizens will not support the separation of Quebec from the 
Canadian federation, while the PQ claims they will if they 
are sufficiently informed of the merits of independence. At 
this point, no one can say positively which way Quebecers 
would vote on an independence referendum. The answer to this 
question must await the outcome of the proposed referendum, 
provided that the referendum is worded in a form which pro­
vides a clear choice between separation or continued member­
ship in the federation. 
/ / 
As a result, the Parti Québécois is very concerned 
about the timing and wording of the independence referendum. 
The rejection of the independence option would be a very 
serious blow to the continued existence of the PQ. Levesque 
has said if the PQ fails this time, it will try again, until 
it accomplishes its goal. 
It is improbable that the Parti Québécois would be 
able to convince Quebecers to support political separation if 
it were to fail in its first effort. The PQ would be hard 
pressed to maintain the various elements which currently con­
stitute its support. Although most members of the PQ seek 
political independence, disagreement over the method of attain­
ing separation would likely follow the defeat of the proposed 
referendum. The separatist movement, unorganized before the 
formation of the PQ, might well fall back into such a state. 
English Canada would most likely consider Quebec po­
litical separation a dead issue if the people of Quebec were 
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to reject a separatist referendum. Hopefully they would not 
brush the whole affair aside, but would seek some accommoda­
tion with French-speaking Canadians of Quebec. If Quebecers 
were to reject the separatist option, the PQ would be robbed 
of its momentum. If the federal government were to follow 
through with positive action to improve the economic and cul­
tural condition of the French Canadian, it would be very diffi­
cult for the PQ to mount another assault on the Canadian fed­
eration. 
Economic Viability 
A major concern of Quebecers pondering the wisdom of 
the independence option is that of the economic viability of 
an independent Quebec. According to one reporter: 
It's true the PQ can make a strong case for the 
economic viability of an independent Quebec. The 
province is huge - some 600,000 square miles, bigger 
than Alaska. It possesses a large industrial in­
frastructure, a wealth of natural resources, vast 
hydropower reserves. Its citizens - 27 percent of 
Canada's population - produced about 45 billion 
dollars worth of goods and services last year. 
That output would rank an independent Quebec 23rd 
among all the nations of the world. 
Yet even with such economic credentials, Que­
becers would have to pay a steep price for inde­
pendence .101 
According to a Canadian professor: "The bourgeois in­
clination among French Canadians is stronger than their nation-
10 2 
alism. They would not give up their life-style for a flag." 
^^^Daniel Latouche, op. cit., p. 69. 
in? 
Raymond Carroll and John Lowell, "Quebec, Oui," 
Newsweek, November 29, 1976, p. 41. 
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However, another political•observer does not agree. He writes: 
. , . we can hazard the hypothesis that nationalism 
has little intrinsic appeal to classes lower in the 
social order, workers or peasants; it appears only 
when it is linked with the solution of deeply felt 
economic ills, often by the presentations of the 
nationalist goal as a messianic solution to all the 
social and economic ills. This identification suc­
ceeds with the masses in certain conditions, which 
are hard to determine exactly, and then nationalism 
becomes a mass force. This has not yet happened in 
Quebec, although there are signs that it might. If 
it does, then Quebec will accede to independence in 
a short space of time.103 
The primary concern here is with the political aspect 
of Quebec separatism and the Parti Québécois and not economics. 
However, many political observers of Quebec contend that eco­
nomic concerns form a major force behind the current separatist 
movement. 
It is imperative that the PQ convince Quebecers that 
independence would not entail harsh economic burdens. It must 
convince the citizens of Quebec that an independent Quebec will 
prosper both culturally and economically. Although Levesque 
has stated that the Quebec separatist movement is a result of 
cultural considerations, economics will play a major factor. 
Statements emanating from those opposing separation have been 
dominated by predictions of doom should Quebec separate. This 
presents a major hurdle for the PQ to surmount if it is going 
to convince Quebecers to support separation. 
1 n % 
Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political In­
telligentsia: A Case Study," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 72, no. 1, 
Spring 1965, p. 168. 
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Analysis of 1976 Victory 
According to one political analyst: "A most interest­
ing fact, demonstrated once again by the [1976] Quebec election, 
is that the level of voter dissatisfaction towards the govern­
ment has increasingly become the safest indication of the out­
come of electoral contests.He believes that the defeat 
of the Union Nationale government in 1970, the spectacular re­
election of the Liberals in 1973, and the defeat of the 
Bourassa government can thus be explained. The expression of 
this discontent has taken two different directions. Many 
anglophones have switched from the Liberal Party to the Union 
Nationale, while francophones have increased their support for 
the PQ. In light of this analysis, the most important question 
for the future of the Parti Québécois is whether it will be able 
to meet the many expectations which were raised during the 1976 
election, including honest government, economic growth, and 
social reform. 
The results of a referendum for independence may depend 
largely upon the performance of the Levesque government. Since 
the Parti Québécois came to power, unemployment has risen and 
investment has slowed. There are reports of businesses and 
English-speaking people leaving the province. Canada's largest 
life insurance company. Sun Life Assurance, long one of the 
^^^Raymond Hudon, "The 1976 Quebec Election," Queen's 
Quarterly, vol. 84, no. 1, Spring 1977, p. 21. 
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symbols of Montreal's stature as a business and financial cen­
ter, announced January 7, 1978, that it planned to move its 
head office to Toronto because of Quebec's language law. Such 
a move could affect more than 1,800 employees and cause an 
estimated $40 million loss to the local economy. The federal 
government appealed to Sun Life executives to reconsider the 
decision. The Sun Life board of directors announced that it 
would delay a vote on its planned move to Toronto, but in May 
of 1978, policyholders voted 84 percent in favor of the move, 
which will soon take place. Some fear that the move will, 
. fan the fire of separatism among French Canadians who 
already believe, with some justice, that there is little room 
for them in English companies. It would weaken the resistance 
of the federalist groups in Quebec who are working to keep the 
. J ,, 10 5 
country united." 
Levesque and his supporters contend that many of the 
allegations concerning Quebec's faltering economy are ground­
less, that they constitute efforts by anti-separatists to dis­
credit the government, and in no way result from Parti Québécois 
policies. The unemployment rate, a $1 billion public debt, and 
huge government expenditures, they point out, were all inherited 
from Levesque's predecessor, Liberal Party Premier Robert 
Bouras sa. 
In order to convince the people of Quebec of its ability 
^^^Canadian Press Comment, "Sun Life Assurance Company's 
Planned Move to Toronto," January 25, 1978, no. 4, p. 1. 
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to bring about those goals which it seeks, the PQ must lessen 
Quebec's current economic plight. Although the PQ claims it 
has inherited such major problems as high unemployment and a 
large public debt, it nonetheless must make progress in these 
areas. Today's problems, no matter what their source, are now 
the responsibility of the PQ. The PQ has stated that Quebecers 
are hampered in finding solutions to their problems because of 
federal interference. Quebecers, however, are not likely to 
be persuaded to vote for separation if the PQ cannot provide 
some evidence of its capability to resolve Quebec's problems. 
The PQ's election was not a mandate for separation, but rather 
a mandate to improve the welfare of Quebec citizens. If it is 
to succeed in bringing about Quebec independence, the PQ must 
demonstrate that it can act effectively as well as convincing 
Quebecers of the merits of separation. 
Recent polls have shown that only a minority of Que­
becers support the Parti Québécois's call for political sepa­
ration, somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 percent, although 
polls vary. Thus it is doubtful that if a referendum were held 
today, it would receive majority support from Quebecers. This 
is not meant to imply that political separation will not occur 
in Quebec, but rather that the Parti Québécois must work to 
convince a large part of its citizens of the advantages of in­
dependence. The Parti Québécois must provide more than 
rhetoric; it must demonstrate through action its ability in 
solving Quebec's problems. 
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English Canada has a great influence in shaping the 
outcome of the separatist challenge. Actions such as that 
taken by Sun Life Assurance may very well strengthen Quebec 
support for the Parti Québécois. If English Canada demon­
strates a lack of faith in the future of the Canadian federa­
tion, it will undoubtably help the separatist cause. If, on 
the other hand, it actively seeks to maintain the present 
federation, it will be much harder for the PQ to convince 
its people to separate. 
This brings up the issue of just how far should Eng­
lish Canadians go in order to keep the Canadian federation in­
tact, Although most Canadians wish to see their country remain 
as it is, some fear that the federal government will make ex­
tensive concessions which alter the nature of the Canadian 
federation. They fear that if the Canadian system were altered 
by decentralizing the powers of the federal government in order 
to satisfy French Canadian separatists, and were Quebec to opt 
for independence, the future of the remainder of Canada would 
be placed in jeopardy. 
Recently there has been developing a feeling among 
some English Canadians that the federal government should stop 
trying to satisfy French Canadian separatists, who only want 
independence, and concentrate on the interests of English 
Canada. Instead of altering the federation, they would rather 
see Quebec go free. Any change in the Canadian federation 
should be evaluated from the standpoint of how it would affect 
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English Canada. In essence, their argument is that a free 
Quebec would be more desirable than a major alteration of 
the federal governmental powers. 
The confrontation of nationalistic forces on both 
sides would leave little hope for the salvation of the Cana­
dian federation. Prime Minister Trudeau has sought to 
placate the demands of the French Canadians through a policy 
of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, thus dis­
missing the notion that there are "two nations" within Canada. 
He believes that nationalistic forces are reactionary. In 
order to maintain the federation, Prime Minister Trudeau must 
check the polarization of nationalistic tendencies of both 
French and English Canadians. 
The next few years will be a time of adjustment for 
Canada and it is necessary that both sides approach the solu­
tion to their problems in a realistic and practical frame of 
mind. The separation of Quebec is a possibility of which Eng­
lish Canadians should be aware. French Canadians should also 
be aware that continued association in the Canadian federation 
is an alternative. Hopefully the resolution of this issue will 
be handled in such a way as to be advantageous to both French 
and English Canadians. 
As for the Parti Québécois, if they should receive a 
mandate for political independence, other issues still remain 
to be resolved. The legality of separation would remain, since 
it is not provided for under the BNA Act. What would be the 
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response of the rest of the world to such a development? What 
would be the federal government's response to a declaration of 
independence by Quebec? What adjustments would English Canada 
have to make if Quebec were to leave? 
Some observers have stated that the PQ might fall 
apart once independence were achieved. Separatists represent 
many different perspectives of the political spectrum; they 
are only united in the desire for separation. If political 
independence were achieved, the possibility of the formation 
of splinter parties would be likely. 
The formation of the Parti Québécois has resulted from 
demands by French Canadians to ensure the prosperity of their 
culture and well being. It also signifies frustration by some 
with the utility of the Canadian federation in solving their 
problems. The Parti Québécois is offering the citizens of 
Quebec an alternative political system to deal with their prob­
lems. It remains to be seen if Quebecers will choose this 
option. 
Although any prediction concerning the success of the 
Parti Québécois's attempt to bring about political independence 
for Quebec would only be speculative, the outcome of this crisis 
will surely leave the Canadian federation a changed system. 
Even if Quebec should remain within the federation it is likely 
that the federal government will be more decentralized than it 
is presently. In the future this decentralization of the cen­
tral government's powers could help result in the dismemberment 
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of Canada, a country which has long struggled with its quest 
for a national identity. A weakened federal government would 
find it difficult to counter the formation of strong alle­
giances to the respective provinces rather than to the na­
tional entity of Canada. Not only could Quebec later decide 
to separate but so might other provinces which find themselves 
many times at odds with the central government. 
It would be ironic if Canada decentralized the powers 
of its federal government in an effort to save the federation 
only later to find that in doing so it had destroyed the 
viability of the very federation it seeks to preserve. There­
fore, not only must French Canadians decide if they are willing 
to forego the price of political separation, but English-
speaking Canadians must also decide how far they are willing 
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